Ethics

Lecture 1 – Introduction
Lecture 2 – Eudaimonism III: Cynics and Stoics The Rationalistic Approach to Eudaimonism
Lecture 3 – Eudaimonism IV: Utilitarianism (Bentham and John S. Mill)—Universalized Hedonism (and Egoism)

ETHICS and AN INQUIRY INTO MORALITY
© 1999 by Eiichi Shimomissé

INTRODUCTION

There are many definitions of the nature of philosophical inquiry into morality or ethics. Ethics or moral philosophy is an inquiry into the nature of what makes a certain action morally worthy and to be commanded, that is, the nature of what makes a certain human action the action which ought to be. Where does this ought (moral obligation) come from?
In ethics, the most basic questions may sound like, “What is the ultimate good that we are to strive for?” “Why and how should I choose this act rather than the other?” How (by what kind of criterion) can I resolve this moral dilemma?” “Why ought I do not only a morally good action, but the morally right action?” Lastly, “why should we act morally?” or “why should we be moral at all?”
To these questions, in the history of humankind, many moral theories were proposed which were supposed to provide the answers. These moral theories attempted to understand why we ought to act morally, and “explain” it so it would make sense. (This naturally presupposes a kind of reductionism ?metabasis eis allo geno.” In words, to explain means to comprehend a certain phenomenon by means of some other phenomenon. However, we do not discuss this until later.)
We also discover that, in the history of humankind, each and every society did and does and will appear to actually provide a set of certain rules of conduct and those of desirable actions, which seem to have “power to command” us to conduct accordingly.
There are two kinds of relativists regarding ethical theories. The first one is called the ethical relativist, who maintains that the ultimate principles of moral conducts are not one, but many and they are relative to certain cultures.
The other relativists mya be called anthropological relativists, who hold that, while they do not deny absolute morality, in actual society all rules of conducts and rules of how to will “good” deeds are relative to a given society itself.
The relativists both in value theory and ethics, therefore, contend that any and every moral command or rule is relative to a given society. Thus, they dispose us with the responsibility to understand and explain how any moral command is based on something else. It may very well be the positive laws, the desire of the despot, God’s command, presumably a certain social contract (this is normally an ungrounded hypothesis, although it could be demonstrated correctly), or the status of a human person (e.g. a slave ought to follow the order of his master), etc. On the other hand, there are others who maintain that positive laws, or the social mores of a given society, are bases for moral commands and obligations, but they must be founded, rather, on morality itself.
These relativist’s views, however, fail to have us understand the meaning of the ought, as their attempts may easily be shown as “circular.” This vicious circle occurs when “ought” is explained by “fact” whereby this “fact” already presupposes “ought” itself. Let us take an example for this situation: When we say, “perjury is wrong. We should not perjure ourselves!” From the point of the positive law and the legal system, we accordingly assume that purjury is indeed legally wrong and a crime, because to tell a lie is morally wrong. On the other hand, unless there is the comprehension of moral ought so-to-speak by itself, we say that we should not lie, bcause the law says so. Or because society and its preservation demands it, we sould not tell a lie. Although this is only one example, there are innumerable cases where such a circularity is invovled. This is the main argument advanced by Kant and G. E. Moore that demanded not a naturalistic position, but the philosophical basis, which we shall see later in the second half of this class.
When we confuse factual moral values and commands with those of universal ethical values and commands and fail to see the differences between them, we pursue, strictly speaking, inquiries in cultural anthropology rather than ethics. The latter deals with the question which asks how, in in a given society, moral values and commands appear as being in concrete practice.
On the other hand, when we look at textbooks in ethics, they present a variety of moral theories, which were proposed by some philosophers and were also put into practice. In the wider sense of moral philosophy or ethics, an inquiry into these theories from the philosophical point of view may also be regarded as tasks of our moral philosophy. The first third of our study will be allotted to understanding these so-called traditional and modern moral theories and critically appraising whether or not they indeed deserve to be called ethics in the sense that they are able to explicate philosophically the nature of ought.
Therefore, in our ethical inquiry, we are expected to asks questions about two rather independent, and yet mutually deeply related goals of moral theories: In ethics, a) we try to elucidate the nature of value (good=moral value), b) to articulate the correct definition of the morally right action, and ultimately disclose the groundwork on which ethics and moral obligation are based. The last attempt Kant called the metaphysics of morals. In the 20th century, such attempt was called by Max Scheler the groundwork of ethics and value theory.
Therefore, we may say, too, that the most fundamental questions which the moral philosophers must pursue are 1) clarification of the nature of good or value, which is the philosophical revelation of the nature of “ought,” and 2) the elucidation of the criterion for the morally right action.
Sophists’ Denial of Moral Philosophy in General
Indeed the Sophists, who did not form any particular school or doctrine, appeared before Socrates and were the contemporary group of philosophers who focused philosophical attention to and inquiry into the inquiry of human affairs instead of nature and the universe. They were well travelled in different areas, both in Greece as well as other countries, and were keenly aware of the significance of language and its investigation. They were cultural anthropologists, lawyers and unequivocally knew that what they had experienced is always relative to a given society and culture. Thus they were not only relativists, but also clearly realists in the sense that they only recognized those which were known and actually experienced. Once they considered that according to their viewpoint, what was to be not only is, but also ought to be factual and therefore relative to a given culture or group, the ideal or that which ought to be was considered meaningless or at least had no significance or implication in reality. Thus, it is easy to see that the Sophists tried to explain what ought to be in terms of what is, take for example, by religious commands (the Ten Commandments in Judaism and Christianity, for example) , by laws and rules of the given country or civilization (e.g. the law of “quid pro quo,” murder, theft, breaking a contract, etc.), or by what was considered “desired” (they did not even want to recognize “desirable”) among the members of the group (e.g. “happiness,” “wealth,” “health,” “honor,” “political power,” etc.). In other words, in and by itself, the Sophists denied the validity and uniqueness of being of what ought to be or what ought to be done. According to the Sophists, it is reducible to (explainable by) something else such as that mentioned above.That is, the Sophists attempted to understand the unique phenomena of what ought to be or what ought to be done by means of certain naturalistic characteristics of the society (the basis of the positive laws such as Divine Commandment, Ruler’s power, need of the coherent society, etc.), of human dispositions (desire, pleasure). Here for the first time, the realist’s viewpoint was advanced and the distinction between what is and what ought to be was thrown away as a unique contrast in philosophical inquiry and instead, the naturalist or realist attempts to comprehend what ought to be by what is. Needless to say, this necessarily led to relativism. There were always appraoches of the so-called eudaimonism.

Eudaimonism I
Socrates’ Philosophy of Morals
The first conscious and systematically attempted approach to moral question may be found in Socrates’ inquiries, although the position may not be so comprehensive. Socrates, like his contemporaries, believed that happiness (well-being–eu– of the soul–daimon– = eudaimonia) is the goal of all human activity. According to Socrates, however, the greatest problem of the human being lies in the self-conceit that one knows what happiness is. Socrates considered this to be the fundamental, human presumption that is to be overcome. The so-called Socratic Mission was to let people in general awaken from such a deep-rooted self presumption to search for wisdom, (which alone promises happiness in the most genuine sense.) In this case, unlike those philosophical positions in contemporary philosophy, wisdom (=sofia) is not limited to cognition of things, but rather the emphasis on obtaining and possessing wisdom lay in those of practical knowledge, the knowledge of morally good and right. Therefore, Socrates naturally contended that once one “knows” what is good (=what ought to be done), one cannot but do this good. Thus according to Socrates in the Apology, being ignorant of (moral) wisdom, one cannot even do evil or harm to an other. He or she is consequently free of moral charge. When Socrates in the Apology said, “You Athenians, who are known in excellence, are you not ashamed of yourselves to not pursue the virtues of the soul rather than fame, wealth and reputation?” Those people who pursue wealth, fame or reputation as the means to happiness are, according to Socrates, blind and totally ignorant of what virtue is and what wisdom is.
Consequently, those who interpret Socrates’ position as intellectualism fail to see this. Intellectualism signifies the knowledge of things and not the knowledge of practical matters and morally good, etc.
Socrates taught that, indeed when properly understood, virtue (arhth) is simply that trait of character upon which the achievement of the good life (eudaimonia=the well-being of the soul) depends. He further taught that the highest virtue is indeed the explicit pursuit of knowledge (filo-sofia=philo-sophia). This explicit pursuit of knowledge and wisdom may be made possible by knowing one’s own ignorance within oneself. In other words, happiness (the well being of the soul) not only depends on the highest virtue?philosophy (the pursuit of knowledge), b ut they are inseparably one and the same.
The pursuit of knowledge as the highest human virtue is an intrinsic value, the good pursued for its own sake. This contention superficially appears to be inconsistent with the above interpretation of the basic thesis of “eudaimonism,” namely it purports that happiness is the ultimate goal of all human beings, whereby some instrumental good such as pleasure, honor, wealth, or the serenity of mind, when pursued, results in happiness.
Let us examine this problem here. Wisdom and its pursuit are from Socrates’ viewpoint not mere means to happiness different from this wisdom and its pursuit, but closer examination reveals that wisdom and happiness are one and the same. This is a very unique philosophical approach which was not followed by his students except Plato and possibly Aristotle.
At any rate, Socrates was the very philosopher who advocated a certain philosophical conviction (to pursue wisdom) and actually lived his life by that philosophy.
Eudaimonism II–Hedonism:
Before we advance further, it may be necessary to make the meaning of hedonism clear, for the term hedonism has been very popular and we use it in ambiguous (more than on meaning) ways. The “moral” doctrine called “hedonism” is indeed one of the so-called major positions among different kinds of eudaimonism. Hedonism is a doctrine which is based on the Greek concept of hdonh– hédoné=sensuous pleasure and contends that since happiness is the goal of our human life, we must seek it in the means of obtaining and enjoying pleasure and avoiding pain, whereby there is no qualitative difference among pleasures. Thus, to a hedonist, the pleasure derived from the satisfaction of a delicious meal is not different from the pleasure of the search for wisdom or the pursuit of knowledge (philosophy). Secondly, since there is no qualitative distinction among pleasures, the sole distinction which interests us is that of quantity, namely it matters how much (quantity) we have and enjoy pleasure. The hedonism considers further that the quantity of pleasure must be understood and explained by the intensity of pleasure. According to Hedonism, therefore, the quantitatively more (intensive) pleasure we have, the happier we shall be.
Hedonists maintain that while most moral virtues are to be learned to “be fond of” and pursue, pleasure is natural and is a very strong inclination that we do not have to command ourselves by “moral ought.” Thus, they contend, it is rather foolish and meaningless to command ourselves to cultivate other moral virtues (which are unnatural almost by definition of “moral ought”) and to perform in accordance with those virtues.
On the contrary, the most important thing, namely what is “morally right,” as understood by the hedonist is to know and try to attain quantitatively maximum pleasure (which is explained as the most intensive) and avoid any possible bodily pain and distress or turmoil of the soul. The quantity of pleasure and pain not only refers to “intensity”, but also sometimes to their “duration.” This shift of the hedonist’s quantitative emphasis from “instantaneous intensity” to temporary duration as the quantitative maximum indeed allowed a sophisticated form of hedonism to be developed by Epicuros.
Thus, hedonism may be defined as the moral doctrine to advocate the thesis, according to which, that what is “morally right” is to be pursued to its maximum, i.e., as either the instantaneously most intensive pleasure of the senses, or of temporary duration in order to obtain happiness, the ultimate goal of the human-being. It is thus important to take into consideration that the quantity of pleasure accommodates not only the instantaneous intensity of pleasure but also temporary duration of pleasure, which will later lead to opening the eyes of the hedonist to the qualitative differences among pleasures (like in John Stewart Mill’s case).
This is not the place to systematically criticize hedonism as a moral doctrine. However, you may find in yourselves easily some faults of this position. For example, it is obvious to any intelligent, sensible human-being that there are differences among different pleasures, as John Stewart Mill said, “I would rather be a hungry Socrates than a satisfied swine.”
It is also obvious to most people that frequently after one intensively pursued pleasure of the senses, we in fact experience pain and even annuli accompanied by pleasure. Sometimes, one may even suffer financial disaster and profound disappointment.
Two Representative Hedonisms: Cyreniacs Epicurianism
(a) Aristippos and The Philosophy of Cyreniacs
Aristippos of Cyrene was one of Socrates’s students (that is why we call him one of the small socratic schools in distinction from Plato and Aristotle). Cyrene is a Greek colonial city state in northern Africa on the Mediterranean coast with mild weather and considerable material wealth.
After the death of Socrates, Aristippos wandered around in Greece claiming to possess “wisdom,” and taught such “wisdom” to the youth of the wealthy, ruling classes with “very high tuition,” but later settled down in Cyrene and founded the school of Cyreniacs. Aristippos advocated a very radical form of hedonism.
Socrates taught indeed that, when properly understood, virtue (arhth) is simply that trait of character upon which the achievement of the good life (eudaimonia=the well-being of the soul) depends. He further taught that the highest virtue is indeed the explicit pursuit of knowledge (filo-sofia=philo-sophia). In other words, happiness (the well-being of the soul) not only depends on the highest virtue, philosophy (the pursuit of knowledge), but they are inseparably one and the same.
Thus, Socrates indeed advocated and practiced that the “wiser” (i.e., the more pursuits) one gets, the happier (well-being of the soul with intrinsic joy of such pursuit) one gets.
Aristippos observed that Socrates did not adhere to any wealth, good clothes, fame, position, nor had he any concern about trivial everydayness, but Socrates, with his simplicity of life, lacking pretense and snobbery, was joyful, accepted invitations to feasts, and other joys of life. From these two mentioned above about Socrates, Aristippos concluded the following from Socrates’ basic insight that the better you are, the happier you are: instead of this Socratic insight, he contended that the better time (happier) you have, the better (morally better and even morally right) you are. For it is natural not only for human beings, but also for the rest of the animals to pursue pleasure and avoid pain and suffering.
Aristippos contended further that our life is finite and short. Indeed, we cannot live it in the past, nor can we live it in the future, but only in the present. And yet, the present or “now” is at this very time here. Instead of pursuing and enjoying honors or wealth, and even the pursuit of wisdom, which either existed in the past or will exist in the future, what is available means at this very moment and here is indeed the enjoyment of sensuous pleasure. Therefore, Aristippos contended that one should enjoy the most intensive pleasure of this moment without worrying about the uncertain future or the past which is long gone.
(b) Epicuros and The Philosophy of Epicurianism
Epicuros from Samos, an island city state in Asia Minor, (341-270 B.C.) developed an interesting, rather moderate and philosophically acceptable moral theory based on hedonism. That is why perhaps when we talk about Hedonism, we think of Epicurianism, which is different from the rather naive, radical hedonism of Aristippos. His father had gone to Samos as an Athenian colonist ten years before Epicuros was born. Therefore Epicuros was able to retain the citizenship of Athens, thanks to this circumstance. Being an Athenian youth, Epicuros also had the obligation to serve two years of military service. So in 323 B.C.he went from Samos back to Athens at the age of 18 and completed this training in military service for two years. This was very a very turbulent period of Athens as a city state. Alexander the Great engulfed Athens and destroyed the basis of the city state, which was the indubitable basis for Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophical understanding of society and state. Some patriotic Athenians organized a revolt against Alexander’s Macedonian army, which turned out to be a complete failure. Epicuros participated in this revolt and had a bitter, disgraceful experience, which taught Epicuros quite well the futility of the political ambition.
Epicuros was well trained by proponents of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies (they both had died). At first he was quite critical of Plato’s philosophy, then later he dissociated from the philosophers of Lyceum. Nevertheless, he hardly acknowledged his learning from any of these and even later contended his scholarship was self-taught. According to some of the recent Epicuros scholars, he attempted a reform of moral philosophy with a new message of “philosophical salvation…”
Athens was, despite being in such political turmoil, still the cultural center of Greece. The Academy of the Platonists and Lyceum of the Aristotelians were still centers of philosophical activity. Quite independent of them, Epicuros gradually established himself as a philosopher and a teacher, and in 396 B.C. purchased a home in Athens with a large garden. Here he founded a new school of philosophy at the age of 36. Soon Epicuros and his school became known as the Garden of Epicuros with almost equal status with the Academy and Lyceum.
In contrast to the Academy and Lyceum, The Garden of Epicuros was known as the people of “good living” and “pleasant companionship” as well as their philosophical thought. It was also known that some of the fellows of The Garden were women as in the Pythagorean Cult. In either case, it was said that women and men are on equal basis in their associations. Epicuros was famous for his generosity (providing his private money as the means to maintain the Garden) and reasonsonableness.
Epicuros’s philosophy deals with one’s own very practical concerns, a way of living, not an abstract system of thought. Perhaps it may be said that the greatest appeal of Epicuros’ philosophy lay in its simplicity and common sense.
In fact, Epicuros defined philosophy as “the daily business of speech and thought to secure a happy life.” Furthermore, he had no doubt about the thesis that pleasure must be the major elements of one’s happy life. According to Epicuros, pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting point of every choice and every aversion, and to it we come back and make feeling the rule by which to judge every good thing….Wherefore we call pleasure the Alpha and the Omega of a blessed life.
Epicuros supposedly outlined his basic thought into forty Cardinal Principles, which were preserved by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers. The most interesting ideas on Epicuros’ hedonism may be found in his Letters rather than in his formal treatise. The best introduction to his philosophy may be found in his letter to Menoeceus, a young disciple to whom he is giving initial instruction in the way of life that will bring greatest happiness.
Let no one delay to study philosophy while he is young nor weary in philosophy when he is old, for no one is either short of age or past the age for enjoying health of the soul. And the man who says the time for philosophy has not yet come or is already past may be compared to the man who says the time for happiness is not yet come or is already gone by. So both the young man and the old man should philosophize (search for wisdom), the former that while growing old he may be young in blessings because of gratitude for what has been, the latter that he may be young and old at the same time because of the fearlessness with which he faces the future. Therefore the wise plan is to practice the things that make for happiness, since possessing happiness, we have everything and not possessing it, we do everything to have it.
Both practice and study the precepts which I contiguously urged upon you, discerning these to be the ABC’s of the good life. First of all, believing the divine being to be blessed and incorruptible, just as the universal idea of it is outlined in our minds, associate nothing with it that is incompatible with incorruption nor alien to blessedness. It is not the man who would abolish the gods of the multitude who is impious but the man who associates the beliefs of the multitude with the gods; for the pronouncements of the multitude concerning the gods are not innate ideas but false assumptions….
When…. we say that pleasure is the aim (of life), we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in high living…, but we mean freedom from pain in the body and turmoil in the soul. For it is not protracted drinking bouts and revels nor ye sexual pleasure nor rare dishes of fish and the rest—all the delicacies that the luxurious tale bears—that beget the happy life but rather sober calculation which searches out the reasons for every choice and avoidance, and expels false opinions, the source of most of the turmoil that seizes upon the souls of men.
Meditate therefore by day and by night upon these percepts and upon the others that go with these, whether by yourself or in the company of another like yourself, and never will your soul be in turmoil either sleeping or waking but you will be living like a god among men, for in no wise does a man who lives among immortal blessings resemble a mortal creature.
Epicuros maintained that if the life which contains the greatest amount of happiness and the least pain should be every human-being’s goal, then by pursuing the impulsive pursuit of immediate and intense pleasure, such a life cannot be achieved. Although Epicuros believed that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain led to the genuine greatest happiness to the human being, he also realized clearly the shortcomings and defects of Cyreniacs, which could not see the painful consequences of dissipation and overindulgence in the natural drive and pursuit of sensuous, immediate pleasure.
According to Epicuros, the ideal human being may be such a person that is indeed wise enough to avoid cheating himself with short-lived pleasures that cost too much, is prudent enough to choose simple pleasures that will endure longer and cost less, and intelligent enough to be free from all possible envy or ambition that would deeply trouble his soul.
For the genuine Epicurean, as Epicuros showed by leading his own life, such a person’s life is the “quiet, cultured life of a country gentleman, surrounded by congenial friends, far removed from the disturbing turmoil of politics or harassing anxiety of economic strife and competition.
This hedonism may be called more restrained, intelligent, prudent. In other words, Epicuros’ moral doctrine or his doctrine of how to live is rightly called the philosophy of living, or you may call it a pursuit of pleasure guided by reason and intelligence in that she/he is the master of his pleasure rather than blindly enslaved by intensity and glamour of the immediate, sensuous pleasures. Intelligence indeed controls emotion and desire, which allows this person to be genuinely free.
And again self sufficiency or self-contentment we believe to be a great good, not that we may live on little under all circumstances but that we may be content with little when we do not have an abundance, being genuinely convinced that they enjoy living most who feel the least need of it; that every natural appetite is easily gratified but the unnatural appetite is difficult to gratify. So plain foods bring a pleasure equal to that of a luxurious diet when once the pain due to need has been removed. And bread and water bring utmost pleasures when one who is hungry brings them to his lips.
Thus, the state of one’s own control of one’s soul in that it is freed from the blind thrust of sensuous pleasure and bodily ill and pain as well as the mental turmoil of everydayness. In other words, the tranquility of the soul and the health of the body must be the greatest happiness one is able to achieve as the highest good.
Therefore, it is said, ‘Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow you may die’ is really a travesty of Epicurianism, the revels in the Garden seem mainly to have centered on mathematics which can be pursued without emotional involvement and entail no hang-over…
Furthermore, Epicuros laid great emphasis on the pleasure derived from having a great friendship:
Of all things that wisdom provides for the happiness of life as a whole, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship. We ought to look around for people to eat and drink with, before we look for something to eat and drink; to feed without a friend is the life of a lion and a wolf.
The well-born man occupies himself chiefly with wisdom and with friendship; of these the one is a mortal good, the other an immortal good.
The significance of Epicuros: hedonism does not lie in the qualitative distinctions among pleasures, but rather, for example, friendship is so important and singled out not because pleasure of the soul is in itself superior to pleasures of the senses. All pleasures are, still according to Epicuros, equally good, qualitatively indistinguishable. According to Epicuros, it is the amount of pleasure that is important.
The intelligent hedonist simply seeks to secure for himself the most pleasure in life and the least pain. He will frequently choose to suffer momentary pain if it enables him to gain more lasting pleasure, and he will always avoid an over-indulgence of physical appetite or desire that brings an unpleasant consequence.The temporary pain of a surgical operation, for instance, is more
than compensated for by the permanently improved health it can produce. Epicuros describes quite explicitly the conduct that wisdom (fronhsis) dictates:
Even though pleasure is our first and native goal, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever but oftimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance issues from them. And oftimes we consider pain superior to pleasures, and submit to pain for a long time when it is attended for us with greater pleasure. While, therefore, all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is worthy to be chosen, just as all pain is evil but all pain is not shunned. It is by measuring one against the other and looking at the conveniences and inconveniences that all those matters must be judged…
Lucretius (96 – 55 B.C.)
He has been known as a Roman poet who is perhaps the most prominent follower of Epicuros in Ancient Rome. In fact, Epicurianism was greatly popularized by Lucretius’ poetry writings: De rerum natura. Lucretius’s masterful stylistic excellence helped a great deal that people were exposed to the philosophy of Epicuros in such a way that Epicuros was portrayed as the savior of humankind from superstitions and all the fears. Lucretius saw mainly in religion evils from which men and women were to be liberated by Epicurianism. This quasi-religious philosophical thought was supposed to protect people from tantalizing disquietude or anxiety, which, according to Lucretius, hindered their achieving happiness. Those evils, therefore, were to be conquered by philosophical insights. It is generally believed that Lucretius learned the epicurean philosophy from lectures on Epicurianism by Zeno (an Epicurean and not Zeno from Kition, the founder of Stoicism) and Phaidros. It is also believed that as to natural philosophy, Lucretius was influenced by the so-called Revivalist natural philosophers.
Epicurianism and Hedonism
. Hedonism always has had followers in the history of humankind, as perhaps not a theory of morality, but almost the justification of the pursuit of sensuous pleasure. As stated above, thanks to Lucretius, Epicurianism has been understood as synonymous with Hedonism, which we showed above as a misconception of Epicuros’ philosophy. This does not mean that Epicuros went beyond hedonism. On the contrary, Epicuros held the basic principles of hedonism to his heart and never left its turf. In comparison to Aristippos and his Cyreniac hedonism, Epicuros was above all a philosopher and made philosophical (and mathematical) investigations the basis for the pursuit of happiness. To Epicuros, indeed pleasure was what good is and the ultimate goal of human life. However, instead of the momentous intensity of sensuous pleasures, Epicuros found the maximum pleasures in those which would endure and even make us wise. In fact, Epicuros himself led the life of a philosopher which is free from bodily pain and from mental agonies and turmoil, enjoying the joy of friendship. He even advocated conscious mastery and control over one’s own pleasures. Thus, what one ought to do, or what is right action is to maintain the hermit like serene life liberated from physical displeasures and from the anxiety and agonies of everyday practical life.
Precisely because hedonism is a theoretical justification of our natural human inclinations (to pursue pleasure), we find hedonism not only in the West, but also in India and China.
As discussed later, hedonism is always associated with egoism (which purports that the criterion of right action is self-interest and the greatest gratification of one’s own self interest is considered the ultimate goal of life), that is, as long as hedonism asserts the pursuit of pleasure, the pursuit of pleasure is unfailingly associated with self interest.
In 18th and 19th century Western philosophy, an interesting modification of hedonism was proposed and obtained considerably wide acceptance, particularly in English-speaking cultures. This version, so-called universal hedonism, was developed and advocated by Jeremy Bentham. The basic principles of utilitarianism are: 1) the criterion for right action is the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people, while 2) the good is indeed pleasure. As discussed later more extensively, Bentham devised the so-called hedonistic calculus in order to determine which is the right action (the right legislation) one should choose. He named this unique doctrine Utilitarianism (see his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislations.) Utilitarianism is hedonism and at the same time egoistic, although egoism is universalized to the greatest number of people who will have the greaatest amount of pleasure. (incomplete)

Eudaimonism III: Cynics and Stoics The Rationalistic Approach to Eudaimonism
When we talk about eudaimonism (the moral doctrine which contends that the ultimate goal of life is happiness), it is very likely we immediately think of Hedonism and at best Epicurianism. We have seen the conclusion Epicuros philosophically reached in his pursuit of Hedonism. Although he did not admit the qualitative differences among pleasures, Epicuros construed the quantity of pleasure in terms of temporal duration instead of its instantaneous intensity. By so doing, Epicuros was able to offer philosophical reasons to choose as happiness the liberation from bodily pain and freedom from mental turmoil and agonies against frivolous pleasures of the senses. Epicuros even emphasized “conscious control” of one’s own pleasures. With this insight, this position is rather close to the other form of eudaimonism, called Cynic-Stoic philosophy.

These philosophers were well aware of the burden of having desires and attachment to possessions as the fulfillment of these desires. They also were well aware of the unsatiability of these desires and self-interest, once one is drawn to those desires, etc. They found that the gratification of pleasures, whether they are sensuous or fulfillment of desires (with attachments to them), is not happiness, because we are completely enslaved by such pleasures and their pursuits. The autonomy of human existence seems totally lost, once hedonistic pursuit begins. They could not see that such enslavement indeed leads us to happiness, but they maintain that human happiness consists in genuine freedom, liberation from pleasures and all pleasure seeking and attachments, which is, according to Cynic-Stoic philosophers, ultimately to live in accordance with nature by shedding the artificial creations of human beings which are the cause of further desires and attachments.
Although these Cynic and Stoic philosophers consider happiness as the ultimate goal of life and the criterion for right action, they did not see that happiness does not consist in the pursuit of pleasures and the fulfillment of desires. On the contrary, how much one is able to be a master and in control of our pleasures, they saw that happiness only can be found in emancipation of pleasure and getting rid of desire and their objects attached by us. The experience confirms that the frivolous excitements of pleasures and selfish pursuit of one’s own desires are, rather, causes for our physical pain and mental agonies and disturbances.

Cynic philosophers such as Antisthenes and Diogenes got rid of all worldly possessions and tried to pursue a simple, scant life, free from of all pleasures and desires and attachments for worldly possessions. Thus, according to Cynic and Stoic philosophers, genuine happiness may be found in the autarcia (autapchia), the virtue of autonomy, i.e, the serenity of the mind within oneself, which further implied to lead a life of nature as much as possible. They had a keen sense of distinction between what is controllable and what is uncontrollable to any human being, and urged that, instead of trying for the uncontrollable, we do our best to be master and in control of one’s own controllable. Thus in the position of those philosophers, genuine freedom of the moral subject is what is aimed at and pursued to attain.

(a) Antisthenes from Athens

Antisthenes was a student of Gorgias and later of Socrates, together with his own students. His philosophy may be best characterized as the unification of the Sophist’s endeavors and Socrates’ mission (due to the influences from Gorgias in the art of persuasion and Socrates in ethical thinking). Aristippos founded his school in Gymnasium Kynosarges, so he and his followers were known as Cynics. Although the answer Antisthenes found is opposite to Aristippos, both of them thought that they followed the basic principles of Socrates’ philosophy.

Although Antisthenes’ argument for dialectic is interesting and very sophistic, we discuss not it here, but his moral theory. Antisthenes held that happiness lies in the special virtue, called autarchy (autarcia), namely being the master and the controller of oneself, whereby one ought to pursue absolute autonomy and freedom based on reason. Antisthenes made the declaration, “Be rather insane than satisfied!” (maneihn mallon h hsqeihn). Antisthenes argued, following Socrates, that wisdom and virtue are one and the same. However, the meaning of “wisdom” was no longer the same as in case of Socrates, where it is the way to approach insight by questioning, but meant to be explicitly aware of the uncertainty of knowledge through experience. Therefore, Antisthenes contended, genuine happiness may not be attainable to the human-being, because the human being must depend on knowledge through experience. From here for practical matters, Antisthenes advocated the “return to the state of nature and natural life” and considered that the life of a hero must be the ideal (paideia) of human life. By so doing, Antisthenes intended that one has to attempt to liberate oneself from traditional religion. Antisthenes supposedly held that while there are many gods according to the state, there is only one God according to nature. Nevertheless he was critical of mythologies and yet considered that myth could be an allegory for moral teachings and explication of other concepts.

(b) Diogenes from Sinopé

Diogenes from Sinopé was born around 412 B.C. in Sinopé near Pontos and died around 323 B.C. Diogenes was a disciple of Antisthenes.

Diogenes presumably advocated strongly the four fundamental principles of Cynic philosophy:

Diogenes demanded that marriage be dissolved and wives and children were to be communal.
Against the nationalistic citizenship of a city state, Diogenes proposed world citizenship.
Diogenes underscored the Cynic demand for an ascetic life. That is, one should give up all luxuries and convenience and stick to the bare fundamentals of human life. Finding the Cynic contention of indifference to cultural products insufficient, Diogenes exhorted one’s complete liberation and autonomy from life’s everyday needs so the ideal of Cynic philosophy of being an ascetic will be fully actualized. Diogenes contended that one must not avoid nor stay away from any laborious hardship (ponos), but one should venture to welcome and positively overcome such hardships in order to become morally stronger and more astute, and annihilate all civilized habits of everyday life through the power of reason.
Diogenes further radicalized Antisthenes’ contention of being independent of society’s ethical conventions and intended to maintain the Cynic non-disgrace which may be understood in the sense of being cynical in the contemporary sense. According to legend, Diogenes even felt a kind of joy in harming the most fundamental moral commands of society.

Diogenes Laertius’ Philosophers states: Once Alexander the Great visited Diogenes living in the wine keg, as hehad heard of the great reputation of Diogenes. After greeting him, Alexander the Great asked if there was anything he could do for him. Diogenes is supposed to have replied, “Step aside, so I can further enjoy the sunshine!”

(c) Zeno from Kition (on Cypress)

Zeno of Kition lived from 336 till 264 B.C. Zeno was a merchant and lost all his wealth by a shipwreck and went to Athens. Hearing lectures on Xenophanes’ Memorabilia, Socrates and Plato’s Apology, Zeno of Kition began his study in philosophy first under the Cynic philosopher, Krates, taking over his ethical ideals. Zeno of Kition further studied under the Megaric philosopher, Stilpon, then under Xenocrates of Academy, and under Polemon. Zeno was supposedly studied for more than twenty years. Around 308, Zeno decided to found a school. His followers at the beginning were called “Zenonites,” and later “Stoics.” (This came from their gathering place, called Stoa poikilh–Stoa poikilé). It was said that Zeno was not a brilliant orator, but was known as an exemplary man of praxis of his philosophy in his life. According to legend, Zeno of Kition was said to have ended his life after the tortures of an accident, because through this incident Zeno lost the joy of living and paedagogical activities.
Zeno of Kition is known as the founder of Stoicism. Fragments from his books, On the State, On the Life According to Nature, On Drive and Human Nature, On the Good and Evil, On Passions, and On Obligation, are known to us. Zeno divided Philosophical inquiry into Logic, Physics and Ethics, the last of which Zeno considered the most important. Zeno’s ethical doctrine was based on Socratic philosophy in the form of the Cynics, while his system on physics was supposedly based on the philosophy of Heracleitus. Zeno considers Logic to be the art of definition and the methodology of knowledge under Aristotle’s influence. Despite the fact that Zeno had been influenced by many philosophical schools, he incorporated them all into the knowledge of a new idea of human-being, that of human action and the place of the human-being in the universe, and he exercised profound influence on many philosophical endeavors in the West until the 17th century.

While in his philosophy Zeno emphasized human existence and ethics, his disciples Cleanthes and Chrisippos shifted the emphasis from ethics to cosmology. As a consequence, Zeno’s philosophy experienced a great metamorphosis. Further, a radical change in the philosophy of Stoa took place through the Stoics of the middle period, Panaitios and Poseidonios. However, interestingly enough, later Stoics such as Epictetus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius Antonius went back rather to Zeno himself and his immediate disciples, Cleanthes and Chrysippos, and followed the direction of Zeno’s original thought, expanding upon them on the basis of their own experiences.

According to Zeno, philosophy is an exercise of our inner striving for wisdom (sofia), which was supposed to be knowledge of divinities and human affairs. Zeno of Kition was particularly interested in ethical human endeavor. Zeno began his ethics with his doctrine of human drives or appetite (=’ormh–horme). The doctrine of drive or appetite was indeed the basis for Fichte’s further philosophical investigations. Among the drives, Zeno pointed out the most fundamental drive of all found in all living beings is the drive for “self preservation.” To Zeno’s observation, being uncontrolled and natural, the drive or appetite affects our each and every action. The drive is, according to Zeno of Kition, for our soul to be taken toward its object, whereby the soul is driven by a representation of such an object. When it is viewed from the logical point of view, drives or appetites are “concordance” (sugkataqeseis) of a proposition with certain propositions. Zeno distinguishes rational beings from non-rational beings. Now the irrational drive or appetite contains in itself “moving power” (kinhlitkon) as the initiating power to an action besides the concordance to a certain proposition. It is not known how Zeno articulated many, different kinds of drive or appetites.

Zeno’s doctrine of drive or appetite is closely connected with his doctrine on purpose (telos). Since the time of Democritus and Socrates, happiness is the ultimate goal of human moral decision and life. According to Zeno, happiness consists in “the rational drive or appetite for a moral life.” The question of what makes life “moral” is answered by Zeno in the same line that the Cynics held. Zeno maintained that what makes our life “virtuous” thus “moral” is revealed in nature itself. So “the purpose of human existence is the virtuous life, which is the life in accordance with nature. ” By so doing, Zeno held, the inner harmony may be created: Our passion alone brings us into our human nature conflicts. The virtuous life or the life in accordance with nature is no other than the rational life. According to Zeno, therefore, “virtue” is defined as the condition maintained by the controlling portion (hgemonikon–hegemonikon) of the mind. What is controlling in the mind is reason or rational knowledge (episthmh–episteme) in distinction from mere opinion (doca–doxa). Reason itself is harmonious and calm. Therefore, those who are virtuous are the rational human-beings who live in accordance with Nature.

Following Plato’s traditional distinctions among virtues, Zeno enumerates four fundamental virtues: wisdom (fronhsis–phronesis), courage (andreia–andreia), moderation (swfrosunh- soophrosune), and justice (dicaiosunh–dichaiosune), whereby phronesis (wisdom) stands over and above the other three virtues, just as the hgemonikon (controlling-masterful) portion of the soul over its other portions. In contrast, Zeno states very little about vices. He characterizes vice as the ignorance of things, whose knowledge (phronesis) is indeed virtue. Once again in agreement with Socrates,

1) knowledge or wisdom about what one ought to do, what one ought not to do and what is neither the case is revealed by Zeno as phronesis or moral sagacity as the highest virtue.
2) knowledge of what to choose, what not to choose and what is none of the causes is explicated as the virtue of moderation.
3) virtue of justice is shown as knowledge or wisdom about which of that properly belonging to each is to be distributed to him/her, which of that properly belonging to each is not distributed and which of that properly belonging to each is not the case.
4) virtue of courage may be found in knowledge or wisdom of whom to fear, what not to fear and what is none of the cases. As is obvious from the above, Zeno further advanced the Socratic wisdom of holding all virtues as knowledge.

Zeno believed that what is good may be related to these four main virtues and anything participating in any virtue. What is evil is related to the vices (ignorance, excessiveness, cowardness and injustice) or anything participating in any vice. It is interesting to note that Zeno classified a group of what is valuable, which are neither virtues, nor vices, which are neither good, nor evil. They are called “the intermediary” (mesa–mesa, after Chrysippos adiafora–adiaphora=indifferent). Zeno distinguished these intermediary into three groups, which may be grouped by means of the degree of selectability in questionable cases.

1) praeposita, prhgmata–praegmata: those which are gifted or preferred by nature: Life, honor, pleasure, wealth, health and beauty
2) abjecta, apoprhgmata–apopregmata: those which are not preferred by nature: Death, disgrace, toil, poverty, illness, weakness and pain
3) those to which no moral value belongs

In Zeno’s moral theory of good and evil actions, the notion of “obligation” or “ought” (paqhkon -patheekon) plays a significant role, which is understood, according to Zeno, as the unwritten laws of nature deeply imbedded in each of us. His idea of boundedness of each individual to society is to reveal itself in the process of nature. It is the way of action of those who are furthering their knowledge and other virtues. The harm of virtuous actions by those rational ones who normally act in accordance with nature derives from passions. Zeno of Kition simply defines “passion” as the contra-rational movement of the soul or its movement against nature or the movement away from an overwhelming compulsion. Passion is, like drive, a surrender to a certain mental action. Furthermore, Zeno characterizes passion as the illness of the mind. Thus the ideal figure of the Stoic human-being, who possesses wisdom of the divine and the human, to be rational and virtuous has nothing to do with passion. For his soul is healthy. Such a human-being is serene in himself and is not driven by a disquieting urge which is rooted in passion. Major passions are, according to Zeno, sorrow (luph–lupe), fear (fobos-phobos), desire (epiqumia–epithumia) and pleasure (hdonh–hedone). Clear articulations such as these may have been made by Chrysippos, but we do not know. Zeno considered that a transition from virtue to vice, once we possess knowledge or wisdom, is not possible. However, he considered that it is normal to slowly and gradually proceed to the virtuous life as in the case of those who make progress (prokopton -prokoption). Phronesis (fronhsis-wisdom) produces progress and there is always the potential nature in the human being to become more virtuous, particularly through education. Zeno is also known as the founder of the pedagogic doctrine and is well known as a very competent teacher.

The faith in the relationship between knowledge and action deeply connected his ethical system to Socratic philosophy and left a great influence, even in later years up to Spinoza.

(d) Seneca, Lucius Annaeus (5 A.D.-65 A.D.)

Seneca was born in Cordoba as the son of Spanish aristocrat Annäaus Seneca around 5 A.D. Seneca was sent to Rome to be educated to become a rhetorian, but soon he changed his study to philosophy. In 41 A.D. Seneca was sent to Corsica, however in 49 A.D. he was taken back to Rome. Seneca was later, in 65 A.D., condemned by Prätor, educator and counsel to Nero, as being contemptuous of Nero and so was ordered to commit suicide in the same year.

Seneca was one of the representatives (together with Epictetus) for the latest development of Stoic philosophy. He came in contact with early Christianity in the field of ethics. Seneca was more a man of practice than of theory and systematic philosophy.

We play with small stones and apply our penetrating insight into absolutely trivial things. These activities do not make us virtuous, but at best learned. Wisdom is far more obvious and simple. To be awaken to and aware of the virtuous motive (Gesinnung), man need not much sciences. However, as in the case of other things, we do also exaggerate philosophy, too. The absence of the standard is our own fault in all. (106 Letter).

To be wise and virtuous is the ultimate goal of moral striving. Only wisdom and virtue are immortal, that the mortal can possess. (98 Letter)

Wherein then lies Seneca’s wisdom? He said: I hold myself onto nature; in this respect, all the Stoic philosophers agree, and not derail from it, educate oneself by means of its laws and example. This is wisdom (De vita beata).

Wise persons live in accordance with the laws of nature. Nature, both human and non-human nature, is regulated by reason. The life in accordance with nature is at the same time rational. To be virtuous means to live rationally. The life in accordance with nature, being rational, virtuous and wise, is anchored in happiness, for which every human being strives.

A life is happy, when the life corresponds to its own nature.

In addition, there must be a healthy spirit, which takes into consideration the basic bodily needs, and has attained a serene disposition without any fear before fate’s changes and attained freedom against desires and passion. Seneca held, “one attains freedom through indifference against the fat. Out of this, that invaluable Goodness arises: The serenity and noble excellence of the spirit, which has found its own solid standpoint.” The Ataraxia–autarqia, unshakable autonomy, and apathia–apaqia, apathy, both of which, in the Greek Stoic traditions, was alive and well in Seneca.

Through these thoughts, Seneca referred to the highest good, which found in it happiness, virtue and wisdom. The highest good, according to Seneca, is disposition in which the accidental has no effect and finds joy in virtue. Happy is the person who is led by reason and wishes nothing else (self-sufficient) and fears nothing. No one can be happy
who has no notion of truth. The happy life therefore is that which resides on the right, reassured judgment and stays with it unmoved. The rational human-being takes nature as its guide, observing and questioning it. The human being obtains “that certain reason, which contracts not with itself, is immovable by opinions, concepts or its own conviction. When such a life is ordered and harmonious, then it attains the highest good.” It is consciousness in the best disposition of the spirit. The question, “why do I strive for virtue?” should not be asked, for I will virtue itself, virtue has not anything better, it is its own reward.”

The human being led by reason is, according to Seneca, suited to community with others.

The human being is created to be mutually helpful… the human being is to live sociably and human life consists in good deeds and harmony, not out of fear, but by mutual love the human life is made into the band of communal help.

As a human being, everyone must protect everybody else, because we are determined to form a community. The good of the totality lies in each individual taking part in amiable thoughtfulness to one another. To harm another human being is against human nature. Should someone else try to harm you, return it with a good deed.” Anger is against nature. Nature demands love, while anger demands hatred. While anger is harmful, nature is full of benefit.

To Seneca death and life belongs to the area of things unessential, in the area of Adiaphora. Death is neither good nor evil. For a good or an evil must be only something actually existing. (Ad Marciam de conolatione) Whether life in general is so valuable is itself another question. I will not ascribe to myself the courage to remain in such a miserable slave trade. (De ira, Book III)

If the pressure of external circumstances is too strong for the human-being, then the human being has the right to reply: “I will show you that there is an open road in every slavery. If our heart is sick and miserable due to our own crime, then one can end the misery and life.” Seneca further said, “There is no necessity to live in crisis. Why not? Because there are all over enough ways to freedom, short and easy ones. We are grateful to God that no one is forced to keep living.” (12 Letter) As Seneca meant the exit, he describes: “Look around, you can end your misery everywhere. Do you see that fall into the abyss? >From there, it leads to freedom! Do you see that ocean, that river and that spring? At the base of it, freedom resides! Your neck, your throat and your heart? Mere ways to end the slavery. Is the exit too much, does it ask of you too much courage and skill, then you ask the easiest way to freedom: Each blood vessel of the body is such a way! (De ira, Book III)/ Fate indeed gave Seneca the opportunity to prove the power of his self confidence through his own suicide….

(e) Epictetus from Hierapolis (50 A.D.-138 A.D.)

Epictetus was born in Hierapolis around 30 S.D. Epictetus was slave to captain of the Emperor Nero’s body-guards, was freed after the assassination of Nero and lived in extreme poverty until he had to leave Rome as Domitian’s philosophers’ prosecutions took place. Epictetos founded his own school in Nikopoliss in Epirus, which he led until his death around 138 A.D. The manual or small handbook on morality written and edited by Epictetus was selections from the lectures noted by Arrianos. Epictetus was a student of Musonius, whom he became acquainted with in Rome. He was well known for his intellectual brilliance since his youth and was not occupied with manual labor. In Rome at that time it was quite fashionable to own an intellectual slave, who actually was seen as the master’s status symbol.

His philosophy, like Seneca’s, emphasized the religious and the moral in that Epictetus and other Roman Stoics were strongly influenced by the Cynics and their philosophy emphasizing maintenance of inner serenity.

As schoolmaster, Epictetus was said to have been forced to teach on theoretical inquiries, too. So he was well acquainted with Stoic epistemology, Anthropology and Psychology. His religious and moral insights were strongly formed by oppression and dependence as with his own status. Such a philosophy reflected the image of a human-being who was by circumstance denied all the most important conveniences and goods. Nevertheless, Epictetus was able to develop a very positive philosophy of life.

Thus, Epictetus’ philosophy stressed the wisdom of independence and rational control of the one’s own internal state of mind (to become the master of oneself), while he advocated that one should give up useless concern and meaningless efforts to change and control the uncontrollable circumstances around oneself. For reason and its meaningful use, according to Epictetus, enabled him to transcend and free himself of all the adversities of life. A typical statement from his handbook says:

Some things are under our control, while others are not under our control. Under our control are conception, choice, desire, aversion, and, in a word, everything that is our own doing; not under our control are our body, or property, reputation, office, and in a word, everything that is not our own doing. Furthermore, the things under our control are by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded; while the things not under our control are weak, servile, subject to hindrance, and not our own. Remember, therefore, that if what is naturally slavish you think to be free, and what is not your own to be your own, you will be hampered, will grieve, will be in turmoil, and will blame both gods and men; while if you think only what is your own to be your own, and what is not your own to be, as it really is, not your own, then no one will ever be able to exert compulsion upon you, no one will hinder you, you will blame no one, will find fault with no one, will do absolutely nothing against your will, you will have no personal enemy, no one will harm you, for neither is there any harm that can touch you. (The Encheiridion)

Epictetus’ philosophy was the greatest approach to control the turmoil and difficulties which may stand in the way of our efforts toward the easy life and pleasant joys.

Just as in the philosophy of Seneca, Epictetus’s philosophy has many resemblances with early Christian dogmas. Epictetus taught that God is the father of all humankind and the human=being ought to be always conscious of his belonging to God. Such a feeling of unity with God is so strong in Epictetus that he even characterized his inner life as being in Divine service. Epictetus said we should revere God’s commands.What happens to the human-being in life comes from God, as God will test our belonging to Him and our commitment to His service, so that we become the living proofs for God.

In correspondence to such a theology, Epictetus’s Ethic provides humans with moral commands for sympathy and forgiveness of evil deeds by human-beings. Epictetus contended that despite the goodness of all human-beings, evil and injustice may indeed result from unfree volition, so human-beings acts wrongfully simply because of mistaken ideas of good and evil. The experience of all adversities and those created by other human beings must be turned into an exercise for the moral will. The ultimate goal of life is to attain the spiritual strength of endurance and denial, which Epictetus formulated as the fundamental rule:

Aneqou kai apeqou! (Endure and Be Unpersuasive!)

Freedom must come from being your own master (control) by reason, and that is also genuine happiness.

1) With such high aims, therefore, remember that you must bestir yourself with no slight effort to lay hold of them (your external things which are not controllable by you), but you will have to give up some things entirely and defer others for the time being. But if you wish for these things also, and at the same time for both office and wealth, it may be that you will not get even these latter, because you aim also at the former, and certainly you will fail to get the former, which alone brings freedom and happiness. (The Encheiridion)

Epictetus talks about the limit of pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, because they are not things that one can control:

2) Remember that the promise of desire is the attainment of what you desire, that of aversion is not to fall in what is avoided, and that he who fails in his desire is unfortunate, while he who falls into what he would avoid experiences misfortune. If then you avoid only what is unnatural among those things which are under your control, you will fall into none of the things which you would avoid….

Here it is interesting to note that Epictetus, as well as Seneca and the early Cynics, held a quite different notion of nature from the Ceyreniacs and Epicureans. The Hedonists contend that pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain are the most natural ways for human-beings. Contrary to this, the Stoics argue that what is natural is indeed rational, whether it is in nature or in the human being. Thus, nature reveals in truth the principles of reason. Therefore, to be in control of the controllable is to be rational and in consequence is to be rational.

3) With everything which entertains you, is useful, or of which you are fond, remember to say to yourself, beginning with the very least things, “What is its nature?” If you are fond of a jug, say “I am fond of a jug”; for when it is broken you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your own child or wife, say to yourself that you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be disturbed.

Epictetus also emphasizes the philosophical understanding of the nature of things and actions, which should enlighten us to the Stoic life of serenity of mind with freedom for oneself that is the genuine happiness that the human being is capable of attaining.

4) When you are on the point of putting your hand to some undertaking, remind yourself what the nature of that undertaking is. …Say if you are ready to go to the public bath, remind yourself of the nature of this undertaking (going to the public bath). Someone may splash you with water, perhaps vilify you and rob you…And be prepared for all possible uncontrollable events which may occur with your own undertaking…Say to yourself, I want to take a bath, and, at the same time, to keep my moral purpose in harmony with nature.”…
Epictetus also warns that the things which disturb us are not the things themselves, but perceptions and judgments:
5) It is not the things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about these things. For example, death is nothing dreadful, or else Socrates too would have thought so, but the judgement that death is dreadful, this is the dreadful thing. Therefore, when we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never blame anyone but ourselves, that means, our own judgements….
Epictetus also in 6)?8) warns us not to be elated or excited about what is not under your control.

8) Do not seek to have everything that happens happen as you wish, but wish for everything to happen as it actually does happen, and your life will be serene.
Physical illness is not moral evil, according to Epictetus:

9) Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the moral purpose, unless that consents. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the moral purpose…
If anything befalls one, one is rather to try to deal with it, said Epictetus:

10) In the case of everything that befalls you, remember to turn to yourself and see what faculty you have to deal with it. If you see a handsome lad or woman, you will find continence the faculty to employ here; if hard labor is laid upon you, you will find endurance; if reviling, you will find patience to bear evil; and if you habituate yourself in this fashion, your external impressions will not run away with you.

15) Remember that you ought to behave in life as you wold at a banquet. As something is being passed around it comes to you; stretch out your hand and take a portion of it politely. It passes on; do not detain it. Or it has not come to you yet; do not project your desire to meet it, but wait until it comes in front of you. So act toward children, so toward a wife, so toward office, so toward wealth; and then some day you will be worthy of the banquets of the gods.
About philosophy,

22) If you yearn for philosophy, prepare at once to be met with ridicule, to have many people jeer at you and say, “Here he is again, turned philosopher all of a sudden,” and “Where do you suppose he got that high brow?” But do you not put on a high brow, and do you so hold fast to the things which to you seem best, as a man who has been assigned by God to this post; and remember that if you abide by the same principles, those who formerly used to laugh at you will later come to admire you, but if you are worsted by them, you will get the laugh on yourself twice…
Epictetus’ interesting practical advice:

33) Lay down for yourself, at the outset, a certain stamp and type of character for yourself, which you are to maintain whether you are by yourself or are meeting with people. And be silent for the most part, or else make only the most necessary remarks, and express them in few words. But rarely, and when occasion requires you to talk, talk, indeed, but about no ordinary topics. Do not talk about gladiators, or horse-races, or athletes, or things to eat or drink–topics that arise on all occasions. But above all, do not talk about people, either blaming, or praising, or comparing them. If then you can by your own conversation bring over that of your companions to what is seemly. But if you happen to be left alone in the presence of aliens, keep silence. Do not laugh much, nor at many things, nor boisterously. Refuse, if you can, to take an oath at all, but if that is impossible, refuse as far as circumstances allow. Avoid entertainments given by outside and by persons ignorant of philosophy; but if an appropriate occasion arises for you to attend, be on the alert to avoid lapsing into the behavior of such laymen…. In things that pertain to the body take only as much as your bare need requires, I mean such things as food, drink, clothing, shelter, and household slaves; but cut down on everything which is for outward show or luxury. In your sex-life preserve purity, as far as you can, before marriage, and if you indulge, take only those privileges which are lawful. However, do not make your self offensive, or censorious, to those who do indulge, and do not make frequent mention of the fact that you do not yourself indulge.

If someone brings you word that so and so is speaking ill of you, do not defend yourself against what has been said… In your conversation avoid making mention at great length and excessively of your own deeds or dangers, because it is not as pleasant for others to hear about your adventures… Avoid also raising a laugh, for this is a kind of behavior that slips easily into vulgarity…
We are able to infer the basic philosophical conviction of Epictetus’ moral teaching, although this advice is indeed very particular and practical. Now let us summarize the fundamental principles of Epictetus:

We cannot control what is beyond our control. For example, fulfillment of desire and search for pleasure do not make you the master of these pleasures, but a slave to them.

Try to control that which is within our power of control, that is, the inner life.

Such control may only be pursued by our reason.

It is also in accordance with nature.

Hardship and toil in life are good (conducive to our Stoic happiness), because they make your mind strong and give more power to your mind to control yourself.

We are able to attain genuine serenity of mind which may be called genuine happiness.

This happy life consists in the serenity of mind pursued by means of reason, and such a rational life with serenity of mind is the ultimate goal of all human striving.

Cynics and Stoics also consider that happiness is the ultimate goal of all human endeavors; therefore, the Stoic (and Cynic) criterion for right action purports that it is the morally right action if and only if it is the choice for action conducive to furthering one’s own happiness.

The will is said to be good, if and only if it chooses an action to further one’s own happiness, according to the Stoic (and Cynic).

Both Cynics and Stoics, as long as they pursue the happiness of the individual, are fundamentally egoistic.

Thus, as long as both Hedonism (including Cyreniacs) and Stoicism (including Cynics) consider the pursuit of happiness to be the ultimate goal of life (=the criterion of the morally right action, which leads to greatest happiness), both Hedonism and Stoicism belong to Eudaimonism. As stated in 10), these ethical theories were developed after the collapse of polis or city state in the Ancient Greek civilization. It is no longer the question of happiness or well-being of the total members or citizens of the city state, but it concerns the individual’s happiness and well-being. Just as the “immigrant philosophers” (Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Heracleitus) were individualistic and their concerns were for the religious question of the individual’s soul, these philosophers were concerned with the egoistic pursuit of individual happiness and well-being.

In the next section, we shall discuss Universalized Hedonism as another Eudaimonism. The name of this moral theory is called Utilitarianism, which originated from Jeremy Bentham in 19th century England. In Utilitarianism, we are concerned with the greatest pleasures for the greatest number of people and the criterion for good is not sought in the individual’s personal pleasure, but is sought in the quantity of pleasure which will affect as many people as possible. In this sense, Utilitarianism is called Universalized Hedonism. This position cannot be necessarily called altruism, but may be called collective egoism, because the criterion for right action is indeed the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people.

Eudaimonism IV
Utilitarianism (Bentham and John S. Mill) -Universalized Hedonism (and Egoism)-

Jeremy Bentham
Jeremy Bentham was born in London on February 15, 1748 and died on June 6, 1832, also in London. Bentham was known as the founder and advocate for the famous Utilitarianism. Both Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, who is much younger, were indeed child prodigies although they are close associates. Bentham was interested in philosophy, reading Greek and Latin when he was very young. When Jeremy was 13 years old (!?), being troubled by the requirement of reconfirmation of his faith in the Thirty Nine Articles of the Anglican Church in order to be admitted to Oxford, he after all entered the University of Oxford.
Jeremy’s father expected him to proceed to study jurisprudence after his graduation from Oxford, and yet ultimately gave up that hope, when Jeremy Bentham’s first book, Introduction to The Principles for Morals and Legislation, printed in 1777 anonymously, instantly made him famous (the opus was officially published in 1789). This book was written to support a new proposal for a certain penal code. Despite Jeremy’s effort with his friends, the proposal was turned down by the then Tory government. Jeremy Bentham, with a strong aspiration for social reform, was greatly disappointed by the politicians, particularly the leaders of his time. Jeremy Bentham had thought indeed that once a certain idea be made public, then it would be immediately put into practice.
Having realized that books and paintings would not reform society “automatically” to a better one, Bentham, his friends and associates formed a political party called “Philosophical Radicals.” Despite its strange name, the party elected a number of capable spokespersons for their programs to Parliament. This success was supposed to be not attributed to the able politicians elected from the party, but rather due to the clear, evident vision for such a reform advanced by Bentham and his comrades. Later, with such an unpopular name for the political party, John Stuart Mill proposed calling themselves “Utilitarians” and the principle for such political, legislative reform was called “Utilitarianism.”
Strange as it may sound, Bentham hoped that ethics would become as exact and precise a science as physics and mathematics. In order to actualize such a vision, Bentham endeavored to describe his thought in such plain terms to propound the greatest happiness principle for the greatest number of people as the criterion for choosing a moral decision as well as certain legislation. Bentham writes at the beginning of his Introduction to The Principles for Morals and Legislation:
Nature has placed man under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand, the standards of right and wrong, on the other chain of cause and effect, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all that we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjections, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. The principle of utility recognizes this subjection and assumes it for the foundation of that system the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law.
What is indubitably obvious from this is Bentham’s unmistakable declaration of the principle of hedonism. Now Bentham defines the principle of utility as an explicit hedonist:
By utility is meant that property in an object whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil or unhappiness, to the party whose interest is considered.
To Bentham, it was absolutely not questionable to assert that pleasure is the good. Among the choices, the one which will produce the most amount of pleasure and the least amount of pain ought to be chosen as the right. Thus, Bentham is not only a Eudaimonist, but also an explicit, full fledged hedonist. Bentham therefore continues:
Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility one may also say either that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that it ought not to be done. One may also say that it is right it should be done, at least that it is not wrong that it should not be done. When thus interpreted, such words as ought, and right and wrong, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when used otherwise, they have none.
Thus, Bentham accepted the presupposition of hedonism unquestionably. What concerned him was to make the criterion for choosing the right action more exact and precise such that it may be easily calculable.
Bentham proposes his famous hedonistic calculus, which has the seven elements to be taken for consideration. They are:
Intensity of the pleasure
Duration
Certainty or Uncertainty
Propinquity or Remoteness
Fecundity, the tendency of a pleasure to produce other pleasures
Purity, I.e. the freedom of pleasure from attendant or subsequent pain, or of pain from pleasure
Extent, the number of persons whom pleasure affects
In order to make this calculus more easily memorized, Bentham devised the following rhyme:
Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure-
Such marks in pleasures and in pains endure.
Such pleasures seek if private be they end:
if it be public, wide let them extend.
Such pains avoid, whichever be they view.
If pains must come, let them extend to few.
Bentham further writes:
To take an exact account, then, of the general tendency of any act, sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and then of all the pains on the other. The balance, if it bears on the side of pleasure, will give the good tendency of the act, if on the side of pain, if bad tendency….
This approach proposed by Bentham clearly indicates the possibility of pleasure and its amount exactly quantifiable. Thus, because of its emphasis on duration and purity, Bentham’s hedonism is closer to Epicurianism than Cyreniacs.
The greatest difference between early hedonism and this Utilitarianism lies in the fact that Bentham positively considered the extent, the number of people who are affected by such a pleasure. Thus the great amount of pleasure is also to be for the greatest number of people. It is important to point out here that Bentham universalizing hedonism is not altruistic at all, but rather collective egoism. This distinction has been overlooked by many moral philosophers.
Bentham believed that first of all, the human being as an individual is determined by the pleasure and pain principle, which is no other than egoism. Now however, Bentham considered that the human being also think of the other and their well being (pleasure). To be sure, Bentham thinks that most people think of the other and of their happiness, too. This does not mean so-called altruism, because if so, Bentham must advocate that the human-being is not egoistic, but considers the other a higher priority than oneself, which Bentham did not hold. Therefore, Bentham’s universalized hedonism is indeed the collective egoism of the masses constituent of the given society.
By considering the extent, Bentham advanced his conviction that intelligent legislators create laws which will entail more suffering and pain to those who would disregard the welfare of other people, and such suffering or pain must outweigh any pleasure they would derive from their (unlawful) actions. In other words, the legislators’ responsibility lies in exactly calculating the amount of pleasure and pain should someone commit a crime, and set up legislation such that the pain and discomfort which derive from the punishment should always outweigh the pleasure of the unlawful conduct. This political thought was a step forward from the natural rights theory advocated by John Locke. Instead of hypothesizing the three states, the state of nature, the state of war and the civil state, Bentham simply pointed out that we are under the governance of the laws of nature (which purport that any human-being chooses pleasure over pain). To support this, Bentham refers to the natural human tendency to choose pleasure, whereby he contends that to subsume oneself under this law of nature is to follow our desires and the anticipation of the high probability of fulfillment. Thus, whichever act follows the principle of utility to the fullest extent is indeed natural and is thus to Bentham the only natural and rationally intelligent human tendency. In order to most properly choose such an act of self subsumption under the law of pleasure and pain, Bentham devised hedonistic calculus ,which is most effectively accomplished by genuine intelligence. The gravest problem of this approach by Bentham, which appeared later to Mill, lay in the quantitative, and non-qualitative deliberation of the maximum amount of pleasure.
John Stuart Mill
John Stuart Mill was born in London on May 20, 1806, the son of James Mill, a close associate of Bentham and a senior member of The Philosophical Radicals. He died in Avignon, France on May 8, 1873. His philosophical contributions are in two areas: The one is the theoretical justification of empirical generalization or induction on the basis of association psychology in epistemology and the other is in the field of ethics, where John Stuart Mill, following Bentham’s footsteps, further developed Utilitarianism. We should not forget his contribution to politics as a member of the lower house for two terms, creating some legislation for the sake of political reform of the lots of the poor and lower classes of people. In this sense, Mill also followed Bentham’s vision and put it into practice.
John Stuart Mill was one of the greatest souls that the United Kingdom ever produced. James Mill, his father, was a very close and leading associate of Bentham and the most able follower of Bentham and his philosophy, not in ethics, but rather in social philosophy and politics. Perhaps his greatest contribution to philosophy and political theory was his pedagogic “experiment,” giving his son John Stuart Mill the most effective humanistic education that was conducive to the child prodigy. According to John Stuart Mill’s autobiography, he began to learn arithmetic and Classic Greek at the age of three. At the age of eight, he started Latin. Now he was reading all the great classics of the Ancient Western Civilization, The Iliad, The Odyssey, the Greek tragedies and comedies, Plato, Virgil’s Aneneid, Lucretius, Cicero’s Orations, etc. Throughout his teenage days, he got up at 6 a.m., studied liberal arts two to four hours before breakfast and five more hours after breakfast, and in the evening he continued by studying the great classics for three to four hours. The curriculum was designed by his father, who did not allow John to play and associate himself with other boys of his own age. His father’s explicit aim was to create a genius thinker who would be able to advance the cause of utilitarianism and its application.
Most boys or youths who have had much knowledge drilled into them, have their mental capacities not strengthened, but overlaid by it. They are crammed with mere facts, and with the opinions or phrases of other people, and these are accepted as a substitute for the power to form opinions of their own: and thus the sons of eminent fathers, who have spared no pains in their education, so often grow up mere parroters of what they have learned, incapable of using their minds except in the furrows traced for them. Mine, however, was not an education of cram. My father never permitted anything that I learnt to degenerate into mere exercise of memory. He strove to make the understanding not only go along with every step of teaching, but, if possible, precede it. Anything which could be found out by thinking I never was told, until I had exhausted my efforts to find it out for myself.
While John Stuart Mill underwent such a rigorous everyday curriculum, he was struck by a severe nervous breakdown at about twenty years of age.
From the winter of 1821, when I first read Bentham, and especially from the commencement of the Westminster Review, I had what might truly be called an object in life: to be a reformer of the world. My conception of my own happiness was entirely identified with this object. The personal sympathies I wished for were those of fellow laborers in this enterprise. I endeavored to pick up as many flowers as I could by the way; but as a serious and permanent personal satisfaction to rest upon, my whole reliance was placed upon this; and I was accustomed to felicitate myself on the certainty of a happy life which I enjoyed, through placing my happiness in something durable and distant, on which some progress might be always making, while it could never be exhausted by complete attainment.
But the time came when I awakened from this as from a dream. It was in the autumn of 1828. I was in a dull state of nerves, such as everybody is occasionally liable to, one of those moods when what is pleasure at other times becomes insipid or indifferent; the state, I should think, in which converts to Methodism usually are, when smitten by their first “conviction of sin,” I seemed to have nothing left to live for. At first I hoped that the cloud would pass away of itself; but it did not. A night’s sleep, the sovereign remedy for the smaller vexations of life, had no effect upon it. In vain I sought relief from my favorite books, those memorials of past nobleness and greatness from which I had always hitherto drawn strength and animation. I read them now without feeling, or with the accustomed feeling minus all its charm; and I became persuaded that my love of mankind, and of excellence for its own sake, had worn itself out….
John Stuart Mill was able to find some literature, poetry, Wordsworth in particular, which had a great healing effect on his mental malaise. It was also said to be the period in which John Stuart Mill became acquainted with Harriet Taylor…. John Mill was 24 years old, to be exact, when he met Harriet at a dinner party and the mutual attraction became immediately obvious, gradually growing stronger. John was quite handsome, extremely intelligent, incredibly widely read and already well established. Harriet Taylor, on the other hand, the wife of a respected gentlemen and mother of two children, was young, attractive, and quite intellectually curious. Her husband was a quite devoted to his wife, but much older and more conservative. Therefore, as it states, “the great romance contained… all the traditional elements of the eternal triangle–the dull but devoted husband, the beautiful but bored wife, the gallant but gullible lover…” Soon John Taylor, Harriet’s husband, found out the relationship between Harriet and this young attractive gentleman was more serious. Several years later, he proposed a trial separation in the hope that it would help Harriet to return to his family, in vain. Then Harriet took refuge in France with John Stuart Mill following her. Later despite all expectations, Harriet went back to her husband. Their affectionate liaison continued 15 more years without coming to any fruition. In 1849, John Taylor died of cancer. They waited two more years until they got married, on August 21, 1851.
The philosophical implication of this relationship between Harriet Taylor and John Stuart Mill was enormous. Mill acknowledged indeed that his opera owed more than half its merit to Harriet. She was also greatly instrumental to John’s involvement in the Women’s Suffrage Movement and other social reforms.
John Stuart Mill’s contributions to ethics is well presented in his book Utilitarianism (1863). John was also a very close associate and heir apparent of Bentham. He never abandoned the name “utilitarianism.” And yet, upon careful observation, it becomes obvious that John Stuart Mill did not follow the basic principles of hedonism, which was the basis for Bentham’s theory. As stated before (at the end of the Bentham section), John Stuart Mill could not and did not believe that human nature is exclusively egoistic. On the contrary, the human-being is almost equally altruistic, particularly in moral consideration. Once he left the turf of egoism, enlightened self-interest as collective egoism does not appear to him to be able to provide the foundation for moral obligation. To John Stuart Mill, altruism is the meaningful basis for the moral command and responsibility. Furthermore, Mill could not help but acknowledge the obvious qualitative differences among pleasures. Abandoning the basic tenet that there are no qualitative differences, but only quantitative ones, Mill can no longer defend Bentham’s hedonistic calculus as the meaningful means for determining as the criterion for right action whether or not a certain action ought to be done.
However, by his loyalty and devotion to the cause of utilitarianism and Bentham, Mill did everything possible to make these differences minimum between Bentham’s position and his own.
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasures and the absence of pain, by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure. All desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the pretention of pain.
John Stuart Mill clearly admitted the qualitative differences among pleasures and other values and what kind of pleasure or joy one seeks depends on one’s own training and culture (=education). It is also interesting to note that Mill already had insight into the human value cognition such that, while uneducated and inexperienced, one knows only the pleasure of lower rank, the educated one with high endowments can see both the lower pleasure as well as the intellectual, higher joy. Mill maintained that quality must be taken into consideration even in the case of pleasure.
When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered that it is not they but their accusers who represent human nature in a degrading light, since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification. There is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasure than to those of mere sensation.
Like Jean-Jacques Rousseau (who distinguished the “general will” from the “will of all”), John Stuart Mill sees in morality and the superior human nature the devotion of the general, common good beyond collective egoism. Therefore, Mill was able to say:
I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbor as yourself, constitutes the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.
Thus, clearly against the traditional egoistic hedonism, Mill took the moral position to be not pursuing one’s own pleasure, but to be concerned about the good and well-being of others. Therefore, since we already know the egoism of hedonistic principles, it sounds quite strange to hear Mill say:
The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness it considers wasted. The only self-renunciation which it applauds, is devotion to the happiness, or to some to the means of happiness, of others.
Thus, John Stuart Mill was looking more carefully at the nature of morality and its ought through his own, well refined eye and by so doing, Mill went beyond the limits of hedonism and egoism completely.
There is always the fundamental principle(s) on which any scientific inquiry is based and the truth of a certain conclusion is justifiable by that principle. In the case of ethics, it is what Mill calls summum bonum, the greatest good. However, in the matter of morality, there has no consensus among philosophers.
All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action… Must take their whole character and color from the end to which they are subservient. When we engage in a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the fist thing we need…. A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of having already ascertained it.
Mill points out to taking a recourse back to the theory of natural faculty, 1) moral sense or 2) instinct, which in itself a matter of debate. 3) The general principles of moral judgment are part of the faculty of reason and through either intuition o induction, according to some philosophers, a certain general laws of morality are given. Although they agree that the moralist of an individual action is not a acquisition of direct perception, but of the application of a law to an individual case. And yet, they disagree as to the ground for and the source of this law. 4) According to the one opinion, the principles of morals are evident a priori, requiring nothing to command assent, except that the meaning of the term be understood. 5) Others maintain that the right or the wrong is a matter of observation. They also do not make an effort to reduce a variety of principles to the most fundamental principle. Therefore, they assume the ordinary precepts of morals as of a priori authority, or they lay down as the common groundwork of those maxims, some generality much less obviously authoritative than the maxims themselves, and which has never thought either to be some one fundamental principle or law, at root of all morality or several, in this case the consistency must be self evident. In short , the absence of cognition of the ultimate standard of morals makes the foundation of the ethics uncertain. According to Mill, Bentham’s principle of utility, the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people, appears to be the basis, even to those a priori moralists.
Therefore, Mill is going to attempt to make sure to clarify Bentham’s principle of utility and its standpoint. AS far as the instrumental value of “good” for example is easy to stipulate and provide it with the reason. However, the intrinsic value of “good” to which the instrumental value is a means is not self evident. Mill contends that the acceptance or the rejection of such an intrinsic value can not be achieved by blind impulse, or arbitrary choice. Mill considers that such a choice of an intrinsic value is rooted in the rational faculty.
Mill would like to present the rational ground for either the acceptance or the rejection of the utilitarian principle.
Mill directs our attention to the fact that according to our common sense, utility as the principle or criterion for the morally right action is opposed to pleasure, which is a grave misconception of the opponents of utilitarianism. However, the tradition of hedonism from Epicurus to Bentham, it is taken as obvious that utility is a pleasure. In ethical doctrines, the rejection or neglect of pleasure seems to be very prevalent right now.
At the same time, Mill warns against the general tendency to identify pleasure in the sense of utility to be identical with an instantaneous pleasure of senses.
It is generally asserted in the utilitarianism as the foundation of morals that utility, or the general happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
By happiness is meant the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. By unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.
However, Mill contends that it is necessary to elucidate what kinds of state of affairs by pleasure or pain, and to what extent this is left an open question. The fundamental principle of utilitarianism is unchanged: The problem of the following statement, “pleasure, and freedom of pain, are the only things desirable..,” two things. As stated later, “desirable” is ambiguous, namely this statement to be acceptable, Mill intentionally commits the fallacy of equivocation. On the one hand, “desirable” signifies that which can be desirable. On the other hand, “desirable” in this context signifies that which ought to be desired. The latter implies that what is desirable is a value and given to us as an ideal to be actualized.
Pleasure, and freedom of pain, are the only things desirable as ends. And all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.
To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure–no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit–they designate as utterly mean and grovelling: as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened, and modern holders o the doctrine are occasionally make the subject of equally polite comparisons by it German, French, and English assailants.
According to the opponents of utilitarianism, as far as the pleasure is concerned, we the humans and swine are the same. Against this contention, Mill contends that the pleasure of the human-being is totally different from that of the beast, that is happiness. For the human-beings possess more elevated faculty than the animal appetite, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which doe not include their gratification.
But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings, and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. …Utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc. Of the former –that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature.
Further Mill insists the compatibility of the following with the principle of utility originally proposed by Jeremy Bentham: Namely, there is qualitative difference among pleasure, that is, some are more desirable, while the other, less desirable.
…some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.
It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depended on quantity alone.
As to the principle of preference or the question of the hierarchy of values, Mill contends that the more intellectually developed, more enlightened (by different values), more experienced one gets, always the better one becomes the judge to see the hierarchy of value.
Of two pleasures if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the most desirable pleasure. …. It is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties.
Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast’s pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even thought they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
The pleasures of the higher faculties uniquely human are more satisfactory and of greater happiness than those of the lower faculties, according to Mill, and at the same time, those who possess the higher faculties are equally capable of the greater pains and sufferings.
A being of higher faculties’ pleasures more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and is certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence.
Mills says that any one could say this is due to pride, the love of liberty and personal independence, , the love of power, or the love of excitement…., its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity….in proposition to their higher faculties.. which constitutes the essential part of the human happiness.
Mill contends that it is always possible and even factual to see that a being with the higher faculties may sacrifice a certain happiness (which is likely lower) for the sake of achieving the higher pleasure.
Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a sacrifice of happiness—that the superior being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not happier than the inferior—confounds the two very different ideas, of happiness, and content.
Pointing out the fact that we are more satisfied with the higher pleasures, we have clear preference of the above than to be satisfied with the lower pleasure (although the latter often are stronger than the former).
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.
Against the objection that sometimes those who are capable of higher pleasure often overwhelmed by the temptation by the lower pleasure. Because, according to Mill, “men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between the bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental.”
They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health despite the awareness of the value of health. And it may be further objected, according to Mill, that they began with great enthusiasm in youth, and yet they in years sink into indolence and selfishness… Ion opposition to these, Mill contends, this kind of change is not a voluntary choice, or before they can devote themselves to the one, they become already incapable.
The preference between two values, Mill argues, can be not decided by the objective hierarchy of values, but rather two equally experienced experts with almost equal intelligence, or the majority, may be differentiate the preference of the one to the other. Apart from the question of intensity, the pleasures of the higher faculties are [referable and superior to the lower in kind.
Mill further emphasizes the significance of the j u s t character in the Utilitarian principle, when happiness is considered.
I have dwelt on this point, a being a necessary part of a perfectly j u s t conception of Utility of Happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare enunciation of such a absurdity as this last, renders refutation superfluous.
The greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people must be both in quantity and quality:
According to the Great Happiness Principe… the ultimate end, with reference to and a for the sake of which all other things, are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people) is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who, in their opportunities of experience (have greater variety of values)… the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may accordingly be denied, the rule and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, to the g r e a e s t e x t e n t possible, secured to all humankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation.
Mill’s defense against the criticism of eudaimonism: There are two objections against Utilitarian Eudaimonism:
the happiness is unattainable to the finite human-beings; the attainment of happiness cannot be the rational end of morality or of any rational conduct.
Mill argues that the pursuit of happiness is not only to aim at happiness, but also alleviation of the pains and sufferings, that may fit more to the humankind
Secondly, Mill contends that the happiness is not the state of a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement, which is impossible, nor a life of rapture, but a predominance of the active over the passive. Thus, those who attains it may be worthy of the name of happiness (which reminds us of Kant). At least by the progress of society, poverty and the lack of education may be augmented, which is a moderate demand for happiness.
Two main constituents of satisfied life are: tranquility and excitement. And those who are relatively fortunate in their outward lot do not find sufficient enjoyment to have it valuable, because they are too much caring for nobody but themselves!
Next to selfishness, the lack of mental cultivation may be pointed out. Against selfish egoists, genuine private affections, and a sincere interest in the public good, are possible…to every rightly brought up human being.
One is capable of using the fortunate sources of happiness within reach and is fortuitous, if he/she may be avoid all the human sufferings such as diseases, mental suffering, unkindness, worthlessness, or premature loss of objects….
Mill distinguishes two different cases (involuntary and voluntary ones) among the decisions, actions and characters in which one learned to do so without consideration of one’s own happiness As to the possibility and obligation of living one’s life without happiness: Unquestionably it is possible to lead a life without happiness.: According to Mill,
it is done involuntarily by nineteen out of twenty (i.e., for the most part, from the force of the given circumstances, thus, for example, to take care of one’s own close relative, when he/she gets seriously ill and cannot take care of himself/herself, the moral value cannot be found in the utilitarian way—i.e., through the consequence of action—), while
it is voluntarily (i.e., freely chosen and decided by one’s own will) by those with the great and noble souls, e.g., “the hero or the martyr, for the sake of something which is he/she prizes more than his/her individual happiness.” Mill asks if this something could be no other than the happiness of the others?
In the cases of 2)– voluntarily—men can do without happiness, which the n o b l e human beings have felt and have become so by renunciation, which is to be the beginning and necessary condition of all virtues.
In these cases, To live without the concern about one’s own happiness is done voluntarily by a very few individuals, the hero or the martyr, for the sake of something which is he/she prizes more than his/her individual happiness. Mill asks if this something could be no other than the happiness of the others?
It is noble to be capable of resigning entirely one’s own portion of happiness, or chances of it; but, after all, this self-sacrifice must be for some end; it is of course not its own end; and if we are told that its end is not happiness, but virtue, which is better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be made if the hero or martyr did not believe that it would earn for other immunity from similar sacrifice? Mill further asks, would it be made, if he/she thought that his/her renunciation of happiness for himself would produce no fruit for any of his fellow creatures, but to make their lot like his/her, and place them also in the condition of persons who have renounced happiness? … he/she who does it, or professes to do it, is no more deriving of admiration than the ascetic mounted on his pilar.
He may be an inspiring proof of what men can do, but assuredly not an example of what they should.
Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world’s arrangements that any one can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state, I full acknowledge that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest fruit which can be found in man.
the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable.
The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of scarifying their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good.
The happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent;s own happiness, but that of all concerned. Mill contends that when no consequence is generally considered as the criterion for the morally right action, but the motive, this should be able to be justified by the utilitarian principle by emphasizing the greatest number of people, namely the extent of the utility.
in the Golden Rule of Jesus of nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. to do as one would be done by, and to love one’s own neighbor s oneself constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility wold enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness or the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole, so that not only he/she may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith my fill a large and prominent place in every human being’s sentient existence…
Some objectors (even more realistic than utilitarians) against utilitarianism, according to Mill, find fault in the just idea of disinterested character with its standard as being too high for humanity. They holds it is too exacting for people to always act from inducement of promoting the general interests of society. Mill tries to correct it by pointing out that these critics confound the criterion of the morally right conduct exclusively to the motive rather than the consequence:
(Such an attempt) is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and to confound the rule of action with the motive of it. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them; but no system of ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so done, if the rule of duty does not condemn them….utilitarian moralists affirms that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of agent.
Mill tries to show this by stipulating an example of saving a drowning person.
He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is worldly right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble; he would betrays the friend that trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations.
to speak only of actions done from the motive o duty, and in direct obedience to principle; it is a miaspprehnsion of the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large.
Mills even further asserts that not only most of the good actions are, not for the benefit of the world, but for the benefit of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up, but also the most virtuous men only need to consider the particular persons, not the world as a whole. By say as follows, Mill optimistically and illogically commits the informal fallacy of composition.
The great majority of good actions are intended, not for the benefit of the world, but that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned….The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue; the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale, in other worlds, to be a public benefactor, are but exceptional, and on these occasions alone is he called to consider public utility…
Objections may be raised against utilitarianism such that the criterion of the morally right or wrong be cold, unsympathizing, dry and hard calculations of certain consequences and disregard the moral quality of the person who makes an action. Because, Mill argues, no criterion of the morally right or wrong has something to do with the moral value of the person who chooses and acts. In other words, ethics and its standards as well as the nature of good have little to do with the moral value of a person and his/her character (unless you are a Stoic). There would not be any progress of a person to be moral. Isn’t it true that the more good or right actions one chose and acted, the morally better a person becomes? It may be possible, however, that our habit or what you call the moral virtue will be developed more, the more we accumulate the morally good deeds.
Utilitarians are quite aware that there are other desirable possessiones and qualities besides virtue, and are perfectly willing to allow to all of them their full worth. They are also aware that a right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character, and that actions which are blameable often proceed from qualities (virtues) entitled to praise.
Although in Utilitarianism the criterion for the morally right action applies mainly to actions, Mill admits, “…in the long run, the best proof of a good character is good actions; and resolutely refuse to consider any mental disposition as good, of which the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct.”
Mill admits that there are different standards of morality (like certain moral laws), but utilitarian principle is designed to decide which is the best in the given situation.
The clarification of the meaning of utility: “Utility” is often accused as immoral, as it is used synonymously with “expedient.” For expedient in the sense in opposing to the right generally means that which is expedient for the particular, specific interest of the agent himself/herself. This meaning is rather inconsistent with the utilitarian meaning of expedient, which presupposes the wide consistent extent of the good. Thus, Mill says, “If the principle of utility is good for anything, it must be good for weighing these conflicting utilities against one another, and marking out the region within with one or the other preponderates…”.
Mill humbly admits that humankind have still much to learn to the effects of actions on the general happiness, and recognizes the indefinite, perpetual improvement. However, Mill distinguish this from testing each individual action by the first principle:
To consider the rules of morality as improvable, is one thing; to pass over the intermediate generalization entirely, and endeavor to test each individual action directly by the first principle is another.
The proposition that happiness is the end and aim of morality, does not mean that no road ought be laid down to that goal, or that persons going thither should not be advised to take one direction rather than another……whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we require subordinate principles to apply it by: the impossibility of doing without them, being common to all systems, can afford no argument against any one in particular; but gravely to argue as if no such secondary principles could bed had…
According to Mill, there are always conflicting considerations and there are always exceptions to the rule.
There exists no moral system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation.
Therefore, Mill argues, if utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility maybe invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible.
Mill correctly points out that the first, ultimate principle of any system or doctrine cannot be demonstrated, as it provides the justification to everything else.
Then, Mill provides the example of inductive demonstration, in which from the premisses that the visible is possible to be actually seen, and the audible is audible, because it is actually heard, etc. Mill attempts to show that the desirable is desirable because it is actually desired.
The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it , and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it.
from here, Mill concludes: “If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not a theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, noting could ever convince any person that is was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness.”
This, however, implies two fallacies, which Mill completely overlooked:
as Moore correctly pointed out, the visible means that which can be seen and the audible is that which is heard. However, the desirable is not that which can actually desired. In fact, as the next fallacy shows, the “desirable” is “that which deserves to be desired” as best, if not “that which ought to be desired.”
As pointed out above, Mill confuses that which is actually desired with that which ought to be desired. His first fallacy is possible only through this informal fallacy of equivocation of the desirable. In fact, Mill took advantage of this ambiguity (having more than one meaning). No way that which is desired implied that which ought to be desired, although the reverse, namely that which ought to be desired implies that which is actually desired.
Mill continues to further commit another fallacy called the “fallacy of composition” here. The fallacious argument goes like this: Since each person’s happiness is good to that person, the general (aggregate of these people’s) happiness is good to those people as a whole. This is absolutely invalid!
This… being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good; that each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.
Mill concedes that in order to prove that it is the sole criterion for the morality that the general happiness is good for the whole people concerned (happiness is the ultimate end of those people), he must also show as well that the people never desire anything else than happiness. It is doubtless that people desire other than happiness such as virtue, absence of vice… Mill contends that the desires of virtue and the practice of virtue itself indeed lead us to happiness, too. For virtues are an ingredient of the individual’s conception of happiness. The same may be said of the majority of the great objects of human life—power, wealth, fame, etc.
Mill admits that there is no original desire for virtue or motive to it except virtue’s conduciveness to the promotion of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. These virtues of the human beings such as fame, power, wealth, etc., when pursued, are necessarily conducive to the whole, general happiness of the society. And this is a sufficient justification for why the utilitarian principle of the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest number of the people is the most fundamental principle for the morality.
Conclusion: John Stuart Mill wrote the book, Utilitarianism, and he named the moral doctrine and that of policy decision making held and advanced by Bentham “Utilitarianism.” (Bentham did not have this name). Mill was also greatly indebted to Bentham in terms of his philosophical development and the teachings of the ideals for the reform of the society. Mill was indeed the best disciple of Bentham.
In this book, two fundamental principles are to be established: On the one hand, Mill would like to demonstrate and justify that the utilitarian principles is the first and most ultimate principle of morality. On the hand, in order to defend the utilitarianism as the ethical doctrine, he also show that the meaning of utilities as well as the notion of happiness should not be construed so narrowly in the sense of Cyreniacs, i.e., the instantaneous sensual pleasure.

The first task of justify that the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people is to be the most fundamental, ultimate principle of morality is a) substantiated by pointing the fact that no first principle or the most fundamental principle of all knowledge or any system, cannot be justified by anything else, as the former provides the ground for the rest. Although Mill had to commit several fallacies in the following attempt, Mill tried to show that indeed pleasure and the absence of pain, that is, happiness, is desirable not only to each individual, but also to the general populace, on the basis that in fact each of us indeed desires happiness (pleasure and the freedom from pain) naturally. This attempt provided G. E. Moore “the chance” to develop his naturalistic fallacy.
The second objective seems to explain by and reduce to moral ought, the duty or the moral obligation may be ultimately based on the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.
Thirdly Mill had to accomplish through comprehending the concept of happiness in the widest possible sense. Namely, this happiness as the goal of human life does not only include the pleasure and the absence of pain, but also all the so-called traditional virtues, such as moral virtue itself, fame, wealth, power, etc. Sometimes, Mill had to show the compatibility or consistency of the happiness with self-love,
Fourthly, Mill would like to point out that there are many inconsistencies among different moral doctrines, which can be tested and should be founded on the utilitarian principle.
Finally, Mill makes a heroic attempt to show a) that utilitarianism is a very practical, realistic ethical doctrine useful to the majority of people, and b) that the case, in which happiness, particularly the one’s own happiness, is scarified and is not pursued as the ultimate goal, is not universal moral standard, but is accomplished by a few, selected heros and martyrs and does not provide the principle which should be adopted, but can be adopted specially. Those who chooses to sacrifice one’s own well-being is called noble in their acts. Although the appearance is against utilitarianism, Mill tried his best to demonstrate that those who achieve self sacrifice are not for anything else but ultimately for the sake of the benefit and happiness of the rest of people.
Indeed in this opus, there are many problems including those informal fallacies committed and yet it is extremely comprehensible in Mill’s pursuit for the groundwork for the utilitarianism as the ultimate principle of morality. Like the Indian philosophical commentary, Mill’s Utilitarianism may be seen as presenting almost all the basic problems for groundwork for the ethics. By carefully reading this text, we are able to learn a great deal of the nature of ethics.