Methods and Problems Of Philosophy

Lecture 1
Lecture 2
Lecture 2 Supplement
Lecture 3

METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY

1999 © by Eiichi Shimomissé
§ 0. Introduction
Our study her has an ambitious aim. In this course it is intended to explore philosophical inquiry into methods and approaches and problems therewith.

Despite many conscious attempts to “reflect” upon the problems involving in the methods in the history of the Western philosophy, there have been very few opera which intend to accomplish the same task as we impose upon ourself. Of course, this alone does not justify why we search for the methodology of philosophy. Nevertheless such a situation indubitably reveals that this area of philosophical inquiry has been neglected in the history of the Western philosophy. The situation of the methodological inquiry in philosophy in the other culture finds itself quite similarly. Therefore, it appears even more urgent that we pursue the philosophical inquiry into its own methods systematically, so we shall be able to contribute to discovering one’s own direction in the philosophical research..

Of course, however, we must recognize that methodological inquiry in and by itself is meaningless, divorced from the actual question in philosophy. A method is solely and exclusively meaningful and unavoidable in any pursuit of knowledge as the means to that knowledge, but it cannot be intrinsic in abstracto. Once, at the turning of the 20th century, it was quite fashionable to talk about “methodology” per se and some of those philosophers who believed this decided to make philosophical inquiry only as the inquiry of the methodology of the natural science. This is also an explicit warning against some of the major approaches in the so-called post-modern philosophy which are currently fashionable in France and other countries. In the similar vein, the so-called philosophy of language per se or divorced from the actual use shall be an object of radically critical appraisal later.

Some philosophers may maintain that the method in philosophy is what we call “logic.” Max Scheler, the great soul who was active the first half of this century in Germany, considered so and contrasted two logical method, namely “deduction” and “induction” with the “phenomenological reduction” or the “phenomenological epoché.” According to Max Scheler, the method is a special tool, by means of which one can pursue an inquiry in philosophy. On the other hand, what we call the phenomenological reduction or epoché is the modification of our basic attitude toward the world in such that by performing the phenomenological reduction, we neutralize the “power” by which a real object is experienced as “real.” By performing the phenomenological reduction, we are freed from the commitment to the reality of the object (or more generally of the world at large) of our experience. Thus, being withheld from being immersed in the “faith” in reality of the world, we are able to “reflect” upon the way in which we know and experience the world.

This use of the term, method in philosophy, is indeed rather traditional and in a very narrow sense. In fact Aristotle, as will be discussed later, held that logical inferences as the methods in philosophy. As mentioned later, Aristotle was quite ambiguous in the role of logic and logical investigation. On the one hand, he considered that logic could not be a serious discipline to be pursued, but a portion of the “general education.” On the other hand, Aristotle made a great deal of his effort to investigate logical problems and wrote three opera, categories, analytica priora, analytica posteriora. The editor of Aristotle’s opera call these three the organon as constituting the great domain of Aristotle’s inquiry into the problem of philosophical methods. Thus, briefly considered, we may concluded that Aristotle was the father or the first philosopher who had an explicit consciousness about the pursuit of investigation into philosophical methodology.

Before we get involved in the philosophical inquiry into methods in philosophy, it may be appropriate to pay an attention first to the question of what we do in philosophy and how a philosophical inquiry is given. Without a proper understanding of what philosophy is all about, we may fail to behold the proper domain of our investigation.
§ 1-1. What do we do in philosophy and how is a philosophical inquiry is given?

As the etymological study later in the next paragraph shows, It was the Greek that conceived and created the world “philosophy.” According to this original meaning, philosophy is nothing but the or pursuit or search for wisdom or knowledge. Any intellectual pursuit to discover and own true knowledge may be understood by “philosophy.” Indeed, it was right that philosophy meant precisely the love of wisdom.

As Diotima, the mythological figure, whom Socrates in Plato’s Symposium quoted, properly described, Love (Erws) was begotten secretly by Poverty (Penia) with Plenty (Poros) who fell asleep at the party held by gods when Aphrodite was born. It is thus neither plenty, nor poor in His being. Since Love was born on the beautiful Aphrodite birthday, he loves beauty. Due to his fate, Love is always poor (due to being his mother’s son), dwelling with want. From his father, Love inherited bravery, strength, was a good hunter, and a searcher of wisdom, that is a philosopher. He was able to recognize where those good things including wisdom lie and to be able to search for them.

Philosophy as love of wisdom (or search for knowledge) is an activity, not an established bulk of knowledge or information we might discover in front of us or might be able to obtain. Due to the consequences of the past philosophers’ activities, we tend to believe that philosophy like a modern science is a system of information. On the contrary, It is the very act and maintenance of the search and indeed of the search for truth. From this it is obvious that philosophy as the search for knowledge (love of wisdom) is indeed underlying any intellectual pursuit of knowledge in whatever the field it may be.

It is a total misconception that we will be able to find philosophy in an opus written by a famous philosopher. Indeed, we are strongly encouraged to study such an opus, but we will never be able to attain the perpetual activity of philosophical inquiry by doing so. Certainly we will be able to discover and learn, if we would like to do so, how to philosophize, how to formulate questions, how to develop one’s own method. Therefore, whether or not philosophy is properly given is a matter of one’s own attitude to discover and properly disclose and digest how to philosophize. In this sense, philosophy must be learned again and again and again.

§ 1-2.Different uses of the term “Philosophy.”

If we thematically look at our own experience, it is obvious that the concept of philosophy was not a special name for the knowledge obtained by a scientific inquiry, but it has many other uses and meanings in our mundane experience. It may be of significance to study these different uses of the concept of philosophy and stipulate the authentic sense of philosophy and philosophical inquiry, although from the beginning of this lecture, we are expected to know it somehow unthematically.

§ 1-2-1 The Colloquial Mundane Use of the Term Philosophy

We say, for example:
“To just enjoy playing, and not to always worry about winning is my philosophy of playing golf.”
or
“To secure the long term profit of investors, to maintain the security and benefits of employees, and to contribute to the community is our corporate philosophy.”

Even people talk about the philosophy of fashion or that of cosmetic, as Karl Löwith once lamented in his Heidegger, Denker in dürftiger Zeit.

Thus, even in our everyday life, we are quite familiar with the term “philosophy” and we use quite frequently the term in our conversation of everydayness. In this sense, philosophy is used to refer to the principles underlying all the activities, whether it is playing golf, managing a corporation, or creating the basic statement of fashion or cosmetic. These principles have nothing to do with our pursuit of knowledge, nor critical appraisal from the fundamental basis. They can be casually held, believed or expounded, and they can be and yet do not have to even be true at all. They are considered as mere beliefs we hold in order to do those activities.
In this sense, we are familiar with this concept of philosophy. This mundane concept of philosophy is, however, and once again can be the starting point of our inquiry into and returning to the original philosophical concept.
§ 1-2-2 Philosophy in the sense of Natural and Moral Science

In another sense, we use “philosophy” in a different sense, i.e., in a more “scientific” way. Before the so-called particular sciences came into being mutually independent and distinguishable pursuits of knowledge such as physics, chemistry, biology, sociology and psychology, philosophy was considered as signifying a pursuit of knowledge.

At the European universities in the Middle Ages, there were four disciplines, that is, Philosophy, Theology, Jurisprudence and Medicine (Unfortunately, for example, Dentistry was not considered as a scientific pursuit, but a practical art like stone masonry.) Philosophy was further divided into two divisions, the Moral Philosophy and Natural Philosophy. Therefore, even today, at such traditional institutions as Oxford and Cambridge Universities, there are only two Faculties, Natural Philosophy which covers all the natural sciences and Moral Philosophy which covers all human sciences. This simply means that they have been upholding the tradition of the Medieval European Universities.

Thus, in contrast to Philosophy as the Pure Pursuit of Knowledge, there were Theology (Investigation and Understanding of God), then Medicine (the arts of care of the human body and cures for diseases) and Jurisprudence (the Study of Law to practice it) at the Medieval and Contemporary European Universities (until the middle of the 19th century). They were considered as the subjects which one could study at the graduate school after having completed the study of philosophies.

In this sense, philosophy was used as synonymous with science. To go back to the origin o this concept, what we understand by science goes back to scientia. Furthermore, scientia was a Latin translation of the Greek word, “hé epistémé,” which simply meant “knowledge.” Namely, in addition to knowledge itself, scientia later also implied the pursuit and love of knowledge.
§ 1-2-3 Knowledge for its own sake: Epistémé (Episthmh) and Practical Skill and Knowledge useful for something else: Techné (Teÿnh)

Gradually (particularly after the 18th century Europe), however, science means predominantly to be the pursuit of a systematic knowledge of nature for is own sake, which even requires special method, skill and special training for it. In this sense, science later in a sense resembles to the Greek term hé techné (= art).

In fact, Plato used hé techné to refer to some of particular sciences and or arts (dominantly knowledge of particular skill and technic for practical purposes, although “hé techné” sometimes refers to specific knowledge and skills pursued for its own sake, too. Take for example, hé mousiké‹music, poetry, mathematics, and philosophy‹, hé techné politké‹political sciences).

In Aristotle, too, many particular sciences were considered arts, as long as they are pursuits of knowledge not for their own sake, but for usefulness, i.e. instrumentally pursued. When the disciplines are considered to pursue knowledge for their own sake, they are called philosophies.

What we call today Metaphysics was thus not used by Aristotle himself, but he called the area of investigation the Primary Philosophy. Indeed, metaphysics are primarily the piles of Aristotle’s lecture note manuscripts next to the lecture notes on Physics, therefore, they were called “Ta Meta Ta Physika.” This will be discussed later in more detail.

This distinction of arts and sciences or arts and philosophy were made not only in terms of the value of such knowledge, but also two different approaches or methods. Arts or techné was pursued and developed with the intention of practical application, while philosophy or science was from the beginning the search for knowledge for it own sake, without any specific application or purpose.
§ 1-2-3 Philosophy as Love of Wisdom or Pursuit of Knowledge as Epistémé.

This has been touched before more than once. It is here that we must perhaps systematically elucidate philosophy in this primordial,.authentic sense. As clearly and distinctly different from the two uses of philosophy above (i.e., moral philosophy and natural philosophy), we have another use, which is a more primordial one and this meaning remains in the depth of all philosophical and scientific inquiry as the basic approach and attitude.

Philosophy in this above sense was very likely used in the sense, when Heracleitus primarily spoke of philosophia ‹love of wisdom‹. What did they, the Ancient Greek philosophers, understand by this concept of philosophy?

It was certainly the sense in which later Socrates himself was awakened to the Mission of ripping off the dogmatic slumber (in which the general populace and the youth in particular were). This dogmatic slumber was indeed self conceit and self-deception to take an attitude and think: “We are wise! We know everything!” while in reality they were not wise, but totally ignorant. In order to destroy such a dogmatic slumber of self deception, one cannot be dogmatic, but first of all, one must become doubt and critical of oneself and one’s own conceit. Further, through this explicit awareness and self-disclosure of self deception and conceit, it helps those who were awakened to self ignorance and luck of knowledge to do search for and pursuit of knowledge and wisdom. As Heidegger correctly calls philosophy the “questioning search,” philo-sophia as the love of wisdom or the pursuit of knowledge possesses thus the following two crucial elements:
1) One must contrive to “doubt and question” all the preconceived ideas and conceits and prejudices such that the doubter or questioner is liberated from those pre-existing dogmas, preconceived thoughts, prejudices and assumptions previously held as much as possible.

2) One becomes free (literally liberated from the blindness of the preconceived dogmas) and starts searching for wisdom and knowledge.
Socrates (other than Apology, the others are more Plato’s philosophical thought) talked about the nature of philosophy mainly in three dialogues: Apology, Phaedo, and Symposium. The explication of the meaning of philosophy briefly stated above was presented in Apology and Symposium (conf. The above). In Phaedo, philosophy was disclosed as “preparation for death,” as all the finite human-beings were trapped in the prison of or imprisoned in the confinement of their bodies. To do search for knowledge is to purify our souls from the senses which blinds and distorts us from knowing reality as it actually is and ready for the separation of the soul from body such that the soul now is fully capable of searching and possessing the genuine, pure knowledge and wisdom.
Thus, in philosophical inquiry, we critically investigate everything. Thereby we attempt to search and attain an awareness of reality as a whole without any preconceived ideas or pre-existing dogmatic beliefs.
§ 1-3 The etymological inquiry into “philosophy

The concept, “philosophy,” was created by the Ancient Greek. It was originally made of two words, the one was “philo” which meant “to love,” while the other was “sophia” that signified “wisdom.” According to the History of Western Philosophy, “philosophia” was supposed to be used by Pythagoras, who called himself a “philosopher,” when he was asked, “What are you?,” according to Diogenes Laërtius’ The Lives of Philosophers, Book VIII.

As this episode may not be true, but at least we can perhaps infer from it that by then, the concepts of philosopher and philosophy had at least an acceptance by the intellectuals. Namely by combining these two concepts, “love” and “wisdom” or “knowledge,” “philosophia” originally and primarily meant “love of wisdom,” that is, “the pursuit of knowledge” in general. In other words, love of wisdom is no other than to pursue wisdom, to inquiry into the nature of thing, and to search for knowledge in general. In this sense, the early Greek philosophers were not only philosophers in today’s senses, they were scientists in the genuine sense (the inquiry into the nature of thing).

Let us organize about this etymological situations:
I-i) Who was the first who used the word, “‘m OlmPmOms” (the philosopher), for the first time? As far as its recorded history is concerned, there are two different philosophers, namely Pythagoras and Heracleitus.

I-i-a) According Diogenes Laërtius’ The Lives of Philosophers, Book VIII, Pythagoras was the first one to call himself “‘m OlmPmOms” (he philosophos, i.e., a philosopher.

When Leon of Phlius asked Pythagoras what (profession) he was, Pythagoras compared men’s activities with the rites of the state (i.e., the Olympic Games) and said that there were people who participated in the games themselves (marathon, wrestling, horse racing, etc.), others came to Olympia to open their shops (to make money), and some others came to see the Games as the audience. The philosophers (lovers of wisdom) are audience or viewers. The human ways of life resembled these: Some pursue profit and wealth and others, to gain their fame (by becoming winners), while the philosophers love truth and wisdom and endeavors to attain wisdom for its own sake.

0-1-ii-a) The first philosopher who used the term philosophy or “OlmPmOlc” for the first time according to Fragments of the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, it was Heracleitus.
Heracleitus was also known to us through his fragments as the philosopher who also said:

Do not listen to me, but listen to the logos (what is said by word or reason) and agree that all things are one…
Both of these “records” rather clearly indicate that philosophy or pursuit of knowledge is not a personal or even true opinion, but information which can be discussed and confirmed by any one interested in (the logos has also the meaning of what is signified by a word and is to be checked by those people who hear and understand it). That is, the philosopher is the person who pursues the knowledge for its own sake which can be expressed by words and confirmed by those who hear and understand those words. Instead of being “relative” it may be called “universal.” We would like to emphasize that knowledge to be pursued in philosophy is neither the kind of personal opinion, nor biased by preconceived ideas.

0-1-ii) It seems quite true, however, that a somewhat implicit awareness of what the philosopher does and what philosophy is all about must have existed prior to Pythagoras and Heracleitus. Due to the force of the circumstances and the stage of the development of philosophy in Ancient Greece, it was indeed Pythagoras that happened to be forced to be awaken to such an explicit awareness of philosophy and of being a philosopher himself. As long as Aristotle’s ideas were accepted, we would say that Thales, the father of Ancient Greek Philosophy, has this idea.

I-ii-a) To the mind of the Ancient Greek, this pursuit of wisdom (= search and love of knowledge = philosophy) was quite different from myth and listening and accepting myth as truth. Thales was supposed to investigate the arché of all things, the arché of the universe or reality. He used this term arché not in the sense of the origin of the universe or all things, as Mythologists like Homer or Hesiod did. What Thales meant by the arché was the principle, the principle of all thing.

Furthermore, the arché in the sense of origin was professed and declared by a great mind in the past or even considered as by the voices of God and cannot be questioned by those people who love knowledge, but the arché in this sense had to be accepted as the truth beyond any doubt and inquiry. In the Christian terms, it is called a revelation. What we called hé arché in the sense of the principle is exactly opposite to this arché as revealed and unquestionably accepted and believed. The philosophical sense of arché is found in its questioning search and implies to be always exposed to a questioning search and ready to be questioned by any critic.

I-ii-b) In the sense of the principle of all things, we do not stop with a certain particular cause for a particular event in order to make use of that knowledge of that cause, e.g., when we found out that the engine overheated, we look for the absence of water in the radiator, the broken fan belt or the mis-functioning pump as its cause. We search for the cause or the principle of all things, i.e., of nature as such. This principle (or the ultimate cause) that Thales searched was something basic from which everything comes into being and to which everything perishes. Despite the apparent generations and corruptions, despite all the changes in nature, the Ancient philosophers believed that there must be something permanent, something which can be the cause of all these changes. In this sense,
the principle was considered something universal.
I-ii-c) The knowledge of this arché is furthermore to be pursued for its own sake, not for any particular interest, such as profit, fame or prestige. IN other words, a philosophical inquiry into this kind of arché is pursued for its own sake, i.e., for its intrinsic value. More radically formulated, this pursuit is clearly understood as that for knowledge, i.e, truth for its own sake.

0-1-iii) Identity and Difference between one (principle) and many (phenomena)
In our mundane experience, this arché or the principle‹Water for Thales‹ (of all things‹all the natural phenomena on earth‹) are not given to us as such, i.e., it is not given as one (principle) but as many (phenomena) in our everydayness.

Philosophical inquiry or a scientific research intends to discover the one behind all the phenomena and will have an experience of being awakened by and understanding of the knowledge that this one is the ultimate cause or principle of all things.

Nevertheless, this one is not immediately given in our mundane experience. And yet each and every phenomenon reveals itself as an expression or an appearance of this arché or principle. In other words, our everyday experience and its phenomena is not other than and cannot be anything else but our starting point of our philosophical inquiry. Without our mundane experience, there will be no beginning and possible no end of our philosophical pursuit.

I-iv) Philosophy as the intellectual activity: Philosophy is not only the obtained or discovered knowledge itself, but also it is primarily the activity, namely the activity to pursue knowledge. It is a state of search from the ignorance to the state of being wise. In order to begin this search, we need to be freed from the preconceived ideas, particularly the self-conceit of one’s being wise. This self conceit is, from the point of view of philosophical inquiry, a self deception. Since it is a self deception, it is extremely hard to awake oneself from it. It requires a radical change of one’s own attitude and conviction. The Socratic questioning and the Cartesian universal doubt are two most prominent ways of awakening oneself from such a dogmatic slumber. Only when we are awaken to one’s own ignorance, we start our questioning search, namely philosophizing.

As the human-being is mortal and finite, it is more desirable and advisable to acknowledge to oneself that such a questioning search may not be complete. Although we have a tendency to believe that what is scientific, is naturally scientifically known is an unshakable truth and will never change, such a misconception of natural science and its knowledge must be made explicit. First of all, scientific knowledge is not only hypothetical (the law of nature has been formulated as a hypothetical statement), which implies that scientific knowledge is indeed conditional, conditional to a certain circumstance, but also scientific knowledge is by nature incomplete. For one of the two most fundamental functions of scientific knowledge is to explain a certain phenomenon which has occurred, and to predict a future occupance of a phenomenon of the same. In order to possess the function of predicting a future event, scientific confirmation cannot be complete. As a corollary to this, scientific knowledge always makes progress. This implies the incompleteness of such a knowledge. Therefore, although in philosophy, no progress is possible in the sense of the natural science, philosophical inquiry may find itself in the form of progress by means of its method.

This will be discussed more in detail later.

§ 2. Methods in Philosophy

As long as we understand philosophy is “questioning search,” and thus “pursuit of knowledge,” this search is not the end product of such a search as a bulk of knowledge or information. On the contrary, any pursuit of knowledge, as long as we are finite, mortal human-beings and it searches for knowledge, this pursuit is a rather “endless” process. It is the process starting from “here,” from this starting point of the self awareness of one’s own ignorance.

It must proceed to where then? As Diotima’s myth in Plato’s Symposium suggestively reveals, in this search, we do not possess the end result of such a search. Yet, we “know” the “value” and its preciousness of that knowledge we are searching for, so we eagerly pursue it, precisely because we do not possess it. As it is the case of any search or an exploration, we do not know the end of its journey. And yet, we possess a kind of “pre-knowledge” or perhaps a “vague awareness” of the final destination of its searching journey.

§ 2-1-1. Method in General

First of all, this vague awareness (mentioned above) is the awareness of the value of such an end and also the value or pricelessness of its search itself.

Among the awareness of the end of search as well as that of its search itself, furthermore, a certain knowledge of “how” and “where-about” to search.

In the metaphorical description, it is the “means” to pursue such a search and intend to attain its end result. Namely it is the direction and thus, we may call it the way or approach. For we cannot pursue knowledge direcctionlessly, without any specific way or approach. This search for knowledge is not beating bushes, but consciously or unconsciously takes a certain direction, a certain road.

Of course, in most of the cases, the decision regarding the choice of the means to that end result may very well be wrong and mistaken. Therefore, the excursion or search may very well be in vain.

In general, therefore, the decision to choose a certain way or road or approach is extremely crucial, also needless to say, to the pursuit of knowledge. It may be so due to the lack of knowledge of the so-called “controlled procedure,” or it may be the lack of knowledge about the preparations (e.g. including the strong enough approach) or the confusion of the knowledge of the end of such a search. It may very well be that we have a totally wrong “direction” and “anticipation” of such an investigation.
§ 2-1-2. Method and Tool

On the other hand, method may find its way in other activities than in the pursuit of knowledge (of course, of which we are most interested in). Take for example, to work on making something by dealing with what Aristotle called productive knowledge. I would like to cut this pine tree in the garden. In order to do this, I have to have an ax, a hand saw or an electric chain saw. Not only the knowledge of the tools in relation to the object to which the tool is going to be applied here is necessary, but also the knowledge of which direction the tree should fall down in as well as the knowledge of how to ax or saw the tree in order to have it happen. The order of the steps necessary for cutting the tree should be considered ahead before we start cutting it. The similar will be applied to any kind of “productive” activity (including making a clay pot, curving a stone into something, etc.). Thus controlled procedure means those different kinds of knowledge in order to act or achieve some particular goal as well as the order of the knowledge and steps. A biological or a pharmacological experiment perhaps requires more elaborate conditions in which an experiment is going to be conducted. Needless to say, so are doubtlessly with the engineering.

Within the complexity which can be specified those order of steps and knowledge of the tool by means of the linear, mechanical causality, how complicated the procedure might be can be solved by the causal connections step by step.

However, when the procedure to be controlled becomes so complex that the linear, mechanical causation (logical inference on the basis of that causality) can no longer handle it. Take for example, to send a moon we are no longer able to linearly follow the procedure step by step, but rather mutual influences and simultaneous processes are to be “controlled” in order to achieve such a goal with the complex means. In this case, we are now developing a controlling procedure called “simulation.” This is certainly one of the first steps to overcome the limits of the linear, mechanical causality. Such a thinking is sometimes called a “system” or a “complex system.” (to continue)
§ 2-1-3. The Etymological Search for “Method”

On the one hand, however, the word “me¡odos” or “methodus” in Latin, “method” in English translation, existed in the Classical Greek, which was made as a composite word from two words, the one is “meta” (meta)‹‹”in pursuit of (something) along side with”‹‹, the other, “¢odos” (hodos)‹‹”the way.” What do these words, “meta” and “hodos,” mean in the Ancient Greek?

Thus, “methodos” as a composite word from “meta” and “hodos” signified and understood as “in pursuit of (a certain end) along side with the (specified and controlled) way.” This concept of “method” in the philosophical significance may be traced back to Hesiod and some Pre-Socratic philosophers via Plato. According to this understanding of the method in philosophy as the Way, the method meant “the Way” (‘odos, keleuqos, patos, each one of which means the way, the road, the path, etc.) in the doubled significance 1) as the Way of one’s devotion of life to the true and the right and 2) as the Way of the questioning search with such a devotion.

Hesiod distinguished the narrow, sterile way of the virtue (in the sense of “success”) from the wider path of wickedness.

Heracleitus was supposed to warn the person who should be mindful when one forgets where the way would lead.

In case of Parmenides, the Way to Truth and Just is shown as the way of the person with the rational understanding that Being is, and is distinguished from the way, which the people of habitual mundaneity and in mortal conceptions follow and are never in touch with Truth. Thus, in the pursuit of Truth lead by Reason shows the Way of Truth with confidence.

In Plato, it appears, this Way ended with the explicit notion of “Method.” First of all, in Plato’s philosophy, the method signified the inquiry or search, that is, to “scientifically” ask a question or the questioning as such. As we shall see it later in more details, his famous doctrine of method as the dialectic to search the ultimate reality. Then, of course, in distinction from the art of persuasion or sophistic art and skill (h sofistikh teÿnh‹hé sophistiké techné‹) of persuading the other regardless of its truth, the correct way and manner of investigation or of the questioning search for reality.

Among the earlier and later sophists, naturally the method signified the way of winning the discussion or the art of persuasion itself (‘h sofistikh teÿnh‹hé sophistiké techné‹) or rhetoric.

According to Hippocrates, the method may find its master example of the art and manner of inquiry in the correct medical diagnosis.

As we shall also discuss later more in detail, Aristotle stipulated the method as the procedure directed to the good with deliberation (‘h proairesis‹hé proairesis‹) which is controlled on the basis of insight and can be obtained by study. It is also considered belonging in general to techné (‘h tchnh).

The above mentioned characteristics of “method” are to be more precisely articulated and defined in terms of a specific end. Thus, we may generally state the nature of method as follows:
The activity to pursue a certain plan or goal in accordance with the controlled procedure.

This etymological explication of the meaning of “method” may apply to philosophy as questioning search as well as any search for knowledge as a scientific pursuit including mathematics.
Before we shall get into the explication of the historical development of the philosophical method or the methods in philosophy, we would like to discuss Aristotle and his method as logic first. For logic was considered for a long time as the philosophical method even until Immanuel Kant. It is necessary to pay a special attention to logic as the philosophical methods.
§ 2-1-4. Methods in Philosophy and the Objective of Philosophical Inquiry
‹an Overview of the Problem Domains Anticipating our Inquiry‹

According to the preceding etymological investigation of the nature of method, the method is “the activity to pursue a certain plan or goal in accordance with the controlled procedure.

We also understand that philosophy is questioning search, the pursuit of knowledge, for its own sake. The pursuit in philosophy neither is to serve theology, nor to control the universe in the case of the natural sciences.

To be sure, there are many scientists who “believe” that in the so-called pure sciences they are pursuing the knowledge for its own sake, while like in medicine, engineering, and even the Skinnerian behavioral psychology, or biology, etc., the knowledge to be pursued is to be achieved for the sake of something else, i.e, a specific purpose and the researchers are well aware of this instrumentality of knowledge. Many physicists believed and still believe that they pursue knowledge for its own sake and not to invent the hydrogen bomb or the neutron bomb, that is, for something else. This attitude is philosophical, but what they come up with as the consequences of their research is always useful for something else.

Nevertheless, the science which is not the sense of epistémé or scientia, but what we at the end of the 20th century consider as a science, has the two most fundamental tasks in its research. The one is 1) to explain a certain phenomenon by means of the theoretical hypothesis (you may call it a law of nature once it is enough confirmed) and the second task is 2) to predict a future event or phenomenon. Should they fail to fulfill these most basic functions, unless the science is too young to accomplish the second goal (e.g. seismology and its failure of predicting a future earthquake), it cannot be considered an established science at all. However, this basic conditions necessarily makes research or the pursuit of knowledge as a science having the usefulness or instrumentality of its knowledge, thus excludes itself from the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Thus, the aim, the goal, of its method is always determined by the practical usefulness.

On the other hand, in the philosophical investigation, the method which functions successfully in its search for knowledge does not serve any other interests or uses but for its own sake. The philosophical inquiry is and has been and will be pursued for the joy of discovering truth and true knowledge for its own sake.

The immediate implication from this is obvious. Philosophical inquiry is not useful, nor practical, even not meaningful to our living at all. In this sense, the philosopher in the genuine sense is non professional, because of the following two senses: 1) it is because the philosopher and the philosophical knowledge are absolutely no use for our practical, pragmatic life: 2) the philosopher and the philosophical knowledge cannot have any professional training (in order to earn one’s living by doing so).

However, this does not mean that the philosophical inquiry has no end or goal, nor even a plan. To be sure that the research and its consequence are neither useful anything else or practical at all.

Neither the knowledge which is to be pursued should be “objective!” It is beyond such a distinction between the objective and the subjective, as Kierkegaard correctly pointed out about the question of our own existence as the reality.

And yet, as long as the method in philosophy is a “activities” to attain a certain knowledge as its objective via certain “procedure,” we must be rather explicitly aware not only of the”controlled procedure,” but also of the “plan,” “objective,” or “end.” This “objective” or “goal” is, as pointed out before, should be known to us even if it is obscure in terms of our cognition of the thing experience.

As we saw earlier, thus, often lead by the value which such an end or a plan possesses, we are only aware of the general direction. Let us follow the phenomenological observation a little further here. The start of philosophical investigation was the explicit awareness that we do not possess wisdom or knowledge itself. In order to have an insight into this, it is absolutely necessary that we are to be liberated from the preconceived ideas, bias, assumptions, presuppositions… In order to liberate ourselves, we are to neutralize those preconceived ideas, bias, assumptions, presuppositions such that they have no power on my way of seeing reality and getting ourselves in our existential involvement. As we saw also earlier, two methods in general available to us. The one of the Thales’ wonder, and the other, Descartes universal doubt.

Due to this beginning of philosophical inquiry, the phenomenological epoché (the bracketing the preconceived ideas, bias, assumptions, presuppositions) neutralizes our dogmatic beliefs, as Husserl said. This may be characterized as a return to Pythagoras’ “audience” as the philosophical attitude during the Olympic Games. In this sense, the philosopher is not in the stream, not in the flow of consciousness, but an observer standing outside of such a stream. This unconcerned, uninterested observer’s attitude seems to work as long as our endeavoring to see, experience and know reality as it discloses itself as it actually is static in two senses: In the sense a) reality itself is unchanging, static. In the other sense, not reality, but our attitude itself is static in tune with the way in which reality reveals itself as it actually is.

Is this sufficient for a philosopher today to have such an static attitude? My reply is: Categorically, No! Why? We should not forget that Karl Marx once said:

The Philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change it!

Besides, reality in which we live is no longer static, but in dynamic change and metamorphosis. We are no longer stand outside of reality and remain as the unconcerned, uninterested observer.
In approaching to reality as it reveals itself as it actually is, the philosopher today is no longer an uninterested audience to the static reality, but h/she is expected and does commit himself/herself to the search for reality itself as it reveals itself. Kierkegaard was right, when he said, the objective truth loses its total significance, but the problem is our urgent, subjective truth of our own existence.

§ 2-2. The Methods in the Classic Philosophy in the Far East

How was the situation of the method in philosophy in the Far East? In order to make our exploration in this chapter rather concise, we will limit our discussion only to I Ching, Lao Tzu and Confucius. We will also not include here the Buddhist’s approach to the philosophical methods. We shall make more detailed elucidations on Methods in Philosophy in Far East between the investigation into the historical methods in philosophy and the methods of the 2oth century.

§ 2-2-1. I Ching

One of the oldest books in Chinese and the only book which survived the Book Burning of Chin Dynasty was I Ching. It was supposed to have authored by Duke of Chou (in Chou Dynasty) around 10th century B.C. It had been used as the book of division for the emperor and the feudal lords.

“I” is understood as Change or “Easy.” When understood Change, I Ching is the book of change, which ontologically understands that reality is indeed in constant change. This Change does not only refer to the environment, the society, and the situation, but also the human-being itself and the outcome of an action by an explicit decision-making. I Ching attempts to answer to have us who consult with it understand the current and the future situation, should we choose to act thus. In this sense, the book is indeed the Book of Morality as well. For, unlike the other methods of divination, which view reality as fatalistic (deterministic, although not in the sense of the mechanical causal determinism), I Ching through the 50 yellow stalks reveals the possible outcome of the situation and then asks the person at issue what you should do.

And it will allow us to avoid a certain outcome (when it is “misfortune”) or to willfully choose the consequence of the same. In the other sense it is also the Book of Moral that the revelation, when it is negative, it will encourage us to be not crushed, as the situation will change and when it is positive, it will warn us that such a positive outcome may not last long, as everything is in change. This method here may be understood as the means for revelation or the revelation of reality itself through the 50 stalks. Tramp or tarot card as the method of prophecy or prediction, for example, simply foretells what is going to happen and such an outcome is inevitable and beyond the human control. This resembles to the prediction of a certain natural scientific theory. On the contrary, I Ching reveals and sees the situation from the purely human moral point of view as the decision maker among the moral choices

Thus, it may well characterized that I Ching as the method of philosophy tries to see, evidences and deliberates together with the existing human person in his subjective, moral decision. This is the Book of Praxis and not a mere that of Divination at all.

Behind this philosophical attitude, there exists the total harmony of the human existence with the nature and the universe. The human-being as being conceived tires not to control nature, not to confront oneself to it, but the human-being by nature flows with the flows and changes of the universe. This naturalism which was not known to the West (even though, among the Western philosophers, Leibniz was the earliest philosopher who read Chu-shi’s writing in German translation and apparently was influenced by it according to Professor Cho) must be understood in the totally different sense from that of the West. In the West, naturalism refers to the philosophical attitude or doctrine, which attempts to reduce to and explain by the process of nature or nature itself every phenomenon which may seemingly not natural. Therefore, it is rather looked down as one of the simplistic reductionism in metaphysics.

The naturalism in the East or the metaphysical understanding of the universe in the Far East is to emphasize and evidence the unity and integration of the human existence into the process of nature and the universe itself. Their harmonious relationship is not only the value, but also is considered the arcual reality.

§ 2-2-2. The Way as “Tao” according to Lao Tzu

The legend tells us that Lao Tzu was contemporary to Confucius and when he departed from one of the border passes, the chief guard noticed that it was Lao Tzu. He asked Lao Tzu to write down this basic thought. So he did it in two thousand words. Recent philological studies are more inclined to suggest that Tao Te Ching is written perhaps rather in the 4th or the 3rd century B.C. (later than Confucius) and is maybe not written by one author, but from many different origins including certain proverbs which were very likely prevalent around the time.

Contrary to this contention by the Chinese philologists, we would like to contend that Tao Te Ching was written by a single person, called Lao Tzu and he may be contemporary to Confucius rather than in a later period.

Tao Te Ching has a clear stylistic unity (in terms of the use of Chinese characters) and the only one use of the proper noun (the reference to Yang Tze River). A little later than when Tao Te Ching was written, the China was unified and many different dialects (particularly of different Chinese characters for the same sound) became to be known to each other. In consequence, homonyms (many different characters for the same sound) were given a certain ordering such that differentiation of meanings took place around the 3rd century. A good example of the situation with this complexity may be found for example in Chuang Tzu. Thus, the style of Lao Tzu differs so totally from Chuang Tzu in terms of the use of exceedingly difficult and complicated Chinese characters used by Chuang Tzu. Needless to emphasize, there is also a very clear unity of philosophical thought in Tao Te Ching.

At any rate, from our philosophical point of view, this question of dates is not so essential in terms of exploring the meaning of the way, whether we choose Confucius or Lao Tzu. For the sake of convenience, we start with Lao Tzu, as the notion of Tao is somewhat more “dominant” than Confucius’. This does not mean that Lao Tzu clearly present the definition of Tao. On the contrary, he discloses that Tao is beyond the definition, because it might define everything else, but itself, as follows:

It is astonishing that Lao Tzu tells us at the very beginning of his work that the word, “Tao,” The Way, is chosen to refer to this ultimate reality itself and the principle of all ten thousand entities of reality for their being (for them to exist), he clearly points out that the language is inappropriate to deal with his metaphysical inquiry and question, because language has been devised and extensively used for articulating and distinguishing one another and showing preference of one to the other.

The Tao that is to be referred to is not what we call Tao in the language of the mundane everydayness. What is to be named can not be described by the mundane, everyday name based on the dualistic thinking.

Then, Lao Tzu declares form the beginning in Chapter 1, “Naming (the use of language) is the source of distinctions, namely, those of the so-called Ten Thousand Things.”

Without (=bracketing and neutralizing) all our desires is the only way in which this (unnameable and undistinguishable) Tao, The Way, is immediately intuited. (Needless to say, this does not necessarily mean that we always live in accordance with the Way of Tao).

With our desires, Tao’s appearances are only known, although these two possess merely different expressions or the ways (Tao and appearances), they are primarily one and the same.

This Way (and its way of existence) is reality itself and when described (not necessarily by the mundane, conventional use of language) it is the primordial truth, of all truths, which serves as the beginning of many other truths.

Thus, according to Lao Tzu, The Way, is more than the philosophical approach as a mans to the authentic way of existence. Equivocally (this is not in the negative sense of ambiguity but it is positive), rather this Way itself is the actual genuine reality, cleansed and purified from our mundane, egoistic, hedonistic desires and greed and power-hungriness of everydayness, and uncovered from any prejudices, preconceived ideas and biases.

§ 2-2-3.Confucius’ Tao as the Moral Way

Confucius was born in the feudal State of Lu in 552/551 B.C. as an illegitimate son of the famous, courageous general, who originally came from the “Shih” class and was promoted to the “Tai’fu” class due to his valor. He died in 479 B.C. in the midst of his journey.

We may wonder why Confucius data are well transmitted to today, while Lao Tzu was totally opposite to Confucius. Confucius was concerned about establishing your name of the ancestry by accomplishing moral righteousness. On the other, Lao Tzu advises us to be inconspicuous, undistinguished, in obscurity but lives quietly in accordance with nature. No wonder Lao Tzu was forgotten, while Confucius was well remembered.

Besides, during Han Dynasty, the teachings of Confucius was adopted as the national principles. Confucius’ teachings have been for this and other reasons the most popular ones in China.

The most important book by Confucius is called Lin Yüh (Analects). This is a collection of Confucius’ dialogues with his immediate students and others. One of the most important contributions of Confucius may be found that, in response to his student or an acquaintance asks, “What is it?”, the real truths are often found iin the most immediate, concrete example of the everyday way of life.

The central, the most important theme or concept of Confucius’ Analects is that of “Jen.” Like many of the basic concepts in Chinese thought, this concept of “:Jen” is also ambiguous. In Confucius’s Analects, the “Jen” appear 105 times, but there we also get no explicit definition, as touched above as the response to the question, “What is Jen?” Every context in which such a concept as “Jen” occurs is a rather concrete situation. Let us take the example the 3 in Book IV:

The Master said, “Only”Jen” knows how to genuinely love people and how to genuinely abhor (wicked) people.”

This “Jen” means in reality a concrete person of “Jen.” This person who actualized this highest value of the human moral ideal can only love people truly and also can really hate (=clearly and properly recognize) people (who are morally wicked and evil). The person who fulfills the highest value of “Jen” is loving and compassionate and cognitively prefer the higher value to the lower as well as has the ability to truly discern and excrete the people of evil deed. Confucius just does simply say, Only “Jen” can love people well and can hate people well….” What Confucius had in mind, when he said this, that the concrete person which actualized the highest value of “Jen” (the Educational Ideal of being Human) can recognize the higher value of a person and is capable of actualizing that value, while the man of “jen” can recognize the lower value as the negative one and is able to abhor it…
Then what does Confucius mean by “Jen?” “Jen” is, according to Confucius, the educational ideal (this is what the Ancient Greek called “‘i aideia”‹hé paideia‹ or the Ancient Romans translated it into “humanitas” which was revived in Renaissance as its educational ideal) of the human-being (with the morality as the highest value). In other words, it signified what ought to be most morally excellent as the human-being according to Confucius. It is the standard of morality for the human-being, by which any value, whether it is high or low, positive or negative, is to be clearly and properly identified.

In fact, in opposition to the Ming, the lower class of the then society in China, altogether the other higher three classes, i.e, Shih, Tai’fu and Shin, are called “Jen.” In this sense, the person of Jen may be the one who actualized the highest ideal of being human according to one’s own class (whether it is Shin, Tai’fu or Shih). And it is not an abstract predicate or concept, but it is a concrete person who does actualize “what ought to be most morally excellent as a human being.” The Ancient use of the Chinese character which sounds an abstract concept is always meant a concrete, particular example, as pointed before in relation to the Japanese Confucian scholar, Jinsai Ito.

Therefore, we cannot accuse Confucius of failing in providing us with the appropriate definition, as Socrates attempted not only asked the question, “ti estin”‹ti estin‹ (what is it?), but endeavors by himself and his discussans to find the definition.. For, on the contrary, it was the Chinese philosophical method or way to call our attention to the concrete, rather everyday situation to have the person of dialogue understand what it means and what it is by such a prima facie abstract concept as “Jen” “Filial Piety,” “Té” etc. The situation is the same with Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, or Mo-tzu.

Contrary to the Western method or approach to reality, the Eastern philosophers take the totally different Way or philosophical method to reality. The process of the procedure to approach reality seems to be exactly the opposite. Namely, take for example, the teacher does not provide his/her disciple with the abstract definition. On the contrary, the quasi abstract concept is illustrated by a concrete, particular situation. This is one of the difficulties that those who are trained in the Western way or method to understand the Chinese classical philosophy. The teacher does not help the student step by step what is to be learned, nor “explanation.” When we were children, we sat properly in front of our father and he aloud reads one phrase after another from Confucius’ Analects. We recites it one by one, and memorized it. Of course, being 7-10 years old, we did not understand what it meant. And many hear passed and often they are forgotten. However, suddenly, our eye are opened to those phrases and we understand them! This is the method of the East.

§ 2-2-4. Method of the Philosophy in “Manual” Culture versus Method of Philosophy in the “Menkyo Kaiden” Culture

This may be characterized as the basic method or way to approach reality. Let me explain a little more by means of a couple of examples: The certificate, called, “Menkyo Kaiden,” is given to the student, when this student completely masters the art and skill of e.g., sword (Kendo). In fact, the teacher does not teach the student by showing how to do certain form or figure, but the student is expected to learn by himself by carefully and constantly observing the teacher day and night. The student must obtain the art and skill as if the student would steal them for the teacher. Once the teacher recognize that the student attained the high standard of artistry, then the teacher will give the student the so-called :”Menkyo Kaiden.” This means literally The “Approval and Admission that all the arts and skills, the secret of truth have been transferred.”

The way or method of the Western philosophy since the Ancient Greek philosophy was to understand the world or the universe, i.e., reality, by means of the universal, “abstract” fundamental notions such as one-many, being-non-being, form-matter, means-end, potency actuality, cause-effect, necessity-contingency, time-space, being (fact)-ought (value), appearance reality, sense-reason, opinion-knowledge, (instinctive) drive-will, etc. In fact, in the Western method (particularly in communication), one is left to imagine and present a concrete example in one’s mind by oneself in order to understand those “abstract” concepts. This is what I would like to call the Manual-Approach. What is the manual approach?

The manual is the step by step instruction for controlled procedure to use a set of rules or a certain knowledge, a skill or a tool. The manual does not refer to a concrete situation, but a very universal and universally applicable. In other words, once the manual is established, any one can go through the manual step by step to master a certain knowledge, skill or the way of manipulating a tool or a machine, unless one is intellectually deficient.

The purpose of the manual is the step-by-step instruction for a certain controlled procedure, which may be learned and used by any one and under any circumstance, that is in principle a universal method of instruction. Those who will utilize the so-called manual method do not need to have already mastered a certain standard of special knowledge, or skill or art in order to apply it. In other words, a total beginner or an amateur may study the manual and will be able to learn it.

For the student in the East, no manual is available. Whether it is a sword maker, a warrior, a Zen monk, or a ceramicist, the method of transferring the truth, the highest arts and the depth of understanding is exactly the same, the method of “Menkyo Kaiden.” The only way in which the secret is revealed to the student is a concrete, particular situation in which it is de facto used. Thus, it is by now obvious that a wrong approach which attempted during Sung Dynasty by Chu-shi to re-organize the Confucian thought into a abstract, coherent metaphysical system.

An opportunity might be given to discuss the Method of “Menkyo Kaiden” later within a different context in this lectures again. Before we leave the Way of the Far East, we would like to look at Confucius’ understanding of the Way in more details.

§ 2-2-5. Confucius’s Tao Again.

We inquired above Confucius’ method in philosophy particularly in teaching and learning between the teacher and the student. Confucius’ method of teaching is typical and representative of the method in the Eas. Let us summarize what is so unique about Confucius’ method of communication and its essential characteristics which is widely practiced in Far East:

It was not the teacher who positively tries to help the student learning. In almost everyday way of the normal life, the teacher presents himself/herself to the student. It was the student himself/herself with his/her positive devotion to learn that enables for learning to take place. The student, if she/he would really want to learn from the teacher, the student worked hard to gain something from the teacher. In short, the transfer of what is to be learned occurs through the student’s positive involvement in and devotion to learning itself.

It is often even expected of the student to steal such knowledge, art, or skill. Ii may be said that it was the only way and method that the student acquired knowledge or skill. The student was expected constantly to observe every motion and every action of his/her teacher, so she/he can de facto absolve everything from the teacher. Learning became thus the student’s total devotion to that of the teacher’s life.

Besides this general feature of the method in philosophy as the method of Menkyo Kaiden,” Confucius’ Analects take a special form and method of instruction, as pointed above briefly. Each of those short passages was remembered by his immediate disciple and then by his discipline of the second generation. The words recorded must be very impressive and unforgettable to the editors, as they were carefully held by those who had heard with their whole heart.

They are not the defintions of an abstract concept, nor are they logical inferences. Indeed, there is not even a single inference or a logical justification in the entire Analects. To be sure, there are several situations in which the student asked teacher asked fruther on the same subject. They are not the grounds for soemthing first stated, but illustrations and concrete cases. Thus, the words are to be immediately understood by the students, and not logically inferred at all. In this sense, these statements which the Western civlization will call “aphorisms” the opposite to the system of science Aristotle attempted to establish. The method of comprehending those words is to immediately grasp by once agaiin presenting in one’s own mind concrete instances of the issue, so the meaning of the statement is unambiguously and intuitively understood.

This may perhaps correspond, however, to rather recisely what Plato (in the cognition of ideas) and Aristotle (in the cognition of the first principles of science) understood by “‘h nohsis”‹hé noésis‹ (immediate comprehension of the higher order). In the West we may have been accustomed too much to view this noésis as the rational intuition. “To noein”‹”to noein”‹ is simply “to see” and “grasp immediately what is given.” It is an first hand, immediate, direct straightfoward knowing of what really is.

Besides these methodological conceptions of the Way in the East, Confucious’ uses of Way are rather very unique and deeply permeated by his thought on morality and the ideal community with moral perfection. Let us examine how he understands the Way in Analects.

Besides a minor use of the way, which simply meant a road or a street (“…fooling around on the “way””), there are several philosophically significant usages of the Way in Confucius Analects.

1) The Way which the human-being ought to do as the human:
Probably this meaning of the Way may be the most fundamental of all his uses in describing his thought. The Way of humanity or humankind was seen as lost at Confucius time.

2) The Way as Confucius’s Morality
When 1) was meant specifically morality, this is the use of his term.

3) The Way which is the Rituals
Confucius often referred to the Ancient Way, that is, the well organized and established rituals of Chou Dynasty, to which Confucius wanted to go back as the means to re-establish the Ideal

4) The Way which is Truth, Teaching and Doctrine
The Truth and the objective of his teaching was meant by the Way and further signified Confucius’ tecahing or doctrine itself.
5) The Ideal of Cofucius’ philosophy:
The Way is understood as the Ideal Community with Moral Perfection.” This was Confucius’ highest value of his teaching and his ideal which he and his students pursued to actualize.

6) The Ideal Community with the high morality.
Not the ideal of Confucius’ philosophy but the Ideal Community is signifed by the Way.
7) The Way in which the social order is to be established:
Further, it also meant “the social order” itself in the narrower sense than in 6).

As well evidenced from the above articulations of the Way, Confucius’ Way is used in many different ways. This ambiguity or equivocation (according to the Wastern way) is evident and apparent to those who heard them and read them by means of the concrete contexts in which they are used.

It is now to go back to Aristotle’s logic and Philosophical Inquiry into Method.

SOCRATES (469/68 – 400/399 B.C.)

Socrates was born in Athens as a son of Sophronicus who was supposed to be a stone mason, while his mother Phénarété was a midwife according to Plato’s Theaetetus. Instead of succeeding his father’s trade, Socrates became a philosopher. Socrates, being extremely philosophically inclined, i.e., he was deeply in search of wisdom (love of wisdom = philo-sophia) throughout his entire life. According to Plato, Socrates thought that he inherited his mother’s profession of midwifery and he thought that the philosopher could be only a midwife for wisdom. For, as according to Socrates, philosophy, Love of Wisdom, cannot equip the philosopher with knowledge or wisdom, nor the philosopher can teach his students by providing them with wisdom and knowledge, as philosophy is the pursuit of knowledge which is only possible by being aware of one’s lack of knowledge and wisdom. Thus, Socrates characterized the role of a philosopher as the midwife of wisdom and knowledge, namely the philosopher can only help the youth and others assisting them to have their own philosophy born and develop, and not impart any knowledge or skills to others like in the other scientific disciplines or arts.

Socrates must have come from a rather well-to-do family because he served as a fully armed hoplite, and he must have been left sufficient inheritance to enable him to serve in the military. Socrates indulged himself in philosophical inquiry.

Socrates, unlike other philosophers, did not leave even a single book.

The sources of Socrates’ image and accomplishments are 1) Plato, a great philosophe

§ 3-1. Aristotle’s Logic and Philosophical Inquiry into Method

According to Aristotle, Science or scientia in Latin (knowledge=’h episthmh‹hé epistémé‹) is distinguished into three domains: The theoretical, the practical and the productive. The immediate objects of these three different kinds of sciences (= searches for knowledge) were considered knowledge (epistémé or episthmh). The ultimate goals for them differs.

The theoretical science aims at the knowledge for its own sake: It was considered deserving the highest and the most genuine sense of knowledge. They are Metaphysics (The theory of being or reality), Physics (natural science), Astronomy, Biology, Psychology, Theology (often included into and synonymous with Metaphysics–Aristotle), and possibly Mathematics.

The goal of the practical sciences was supposed to strive ultimately for (how to) better “conduct” as the polis as a whole or as an individual as a constituent part of the polis. This comprises Political Sciences and Ethics (the study of character).

The productive science is a typical instrumental knowledge, which will provide us with knowledge and skills for an efficient, useful and beautiful tool. What was called «eßnh­­techné– was to belong to this category of knowledge. This kind of knowledge or skill was supposed to pursue knowledge for something else, the knowledge useful for some specific utility. Although Aristotle included dialektikh‹dialectiké‹ or dialectic into this genre of knowledge (as defined by Socrates-Plato as the “method” to pursue the knowledge pursued for its own sake, and in this sense, dialectic was not understood as a techné, but epistémé‹’h dialektikh episthmh‹this will be more discussed in details), certainly ‘rhtorikh–rhetoric–, medicine, such knowledge and skill of all the craftsmanship as ship building, carpentry, stone masonry, dentistry, the skill of house-hold‹economics‹( ÿkonomiÿ‹oikonomia‹), etc. Strange enough, the logic, the study of inference, did not appear in any of these three areas of knowledge. Aristotle was supposed to consider logic as the portion of the general education for the youth.

Arabic Aristotelians and the Medieval scholastics considered the logic is one of the most important Aristotelian sciences and divided logic in the formal logic and the material logic, latter of which they considered a “substantive science.” According to Aristotle, however, logic was not a “substantive science,” thus it does not belong to any of these three domains of knowledge or scientia, particularly not to that of the theoretical science. As briefly touched above, indeed Aristotle apparently thought that logic should be a “part of general culture which everyone should undergo before he studies any science, and which alone will enable him to know for what sorts of proposition he should demand proof and what sorts of proof he should demand for them.” The similar idea underlies his use of the term, “Organon,” or “instrumentum scientiae.”

On the other hand, in Aristotle’s philosophical inquiry, however, as a technical term, what we consider “method” became under the heading of “organon,” although Aristotle was not aware of the notion, “logic,” which was introduced in the period of Cicero, while h logikh‹hé logké‹ was meant rather “dialectic.” Rather later, Alexander, the editor and commentator of Aristotle’s works conceived “logic” in what we mean today by “logic,” that is the analysis of inference or reasoning into the figures of syllogism. Despite the famous contention of Trendelenburg, Willamowits-Möllendorff and W. D. Ross, it will make perhaps better sense, should we consider the works on logic Aristotle’s later opera, while those opera which make reference to logic as the a part of general education should be regarded as earlier works?

Aristotle’s works on logic may be safely divided into three areas.

1) Analytica Priora:
In this work, Aristotle tries to reveal the structure apparently common to all reasoning‹syllogism‹and to enumerate its formal varieties despite any subject matter dealt with. This was called “formal logic” since the late Ancient period and it may be rephrased as the logic of consistency. This discovery of the formal character of the nature of reasoning is one of the most important, epoch-making scientific advancement. It was such a gigantic finding in logic that it almost “hindered” thousands of years to redirect our new research in logical investigation.
2) The Analytica Posteriora:
Herein Aristotle investigates the further characteristics of a syllogism when it is valid, I.e., not merely self-consistent, but also in the “full sense scientific.” This portion of his logical investigation not only examines and test the validity of the self consistency, but deals with the truth, the truth of the knowledge of the reality. This is why this portion of logic was called later the material logic and the portion of the so-called informal logic.
3) The Topics and Sophistic Elenchi.

Aristotle explores here those modes of reasoning or inference which are syllogistically correct but fail to satisfy one of more of the conditions of scientific thought. The Categories and the De itnerpretatione, are devoted to the study of the term (the semiotic finds here its historical origin of its science) and the proposition respectively, which is considered rather preliminary.
§ 3-2. Aristotle’s Inquiry into Syllogism as The Methodology of His Philosophical Investigation: Analytics

Now it seems quite obvious that Aristotle made an enormous and explicitly conscious first step in the investigation into the nature of method in philosophy and scientific inquiry. By means of the form of language Aristotle attempted to inquire the philosophical method,i.e., the nature of the logic, the validity of argument, the principle of contradiction and that of excluded middle, etc. As the form of an argument (=logical inference) “syllogism” was deliberately chosen by Aristotle. For the language‹’h logos (the logos, that which is expressed by words: I would like to avoid to translate “logos” into “reason.”)‹ is the natural, most proper means for such an investigation. And Aristotle rather proposed and called the way or approach of scientific inquiry “analysis,”
and its investigation, ‘h a ÿl tikh‹hé analytiké‹(analytics).

It is well known that Aristotle considered the dialectic as the other important method of scientific inquiry and philosophy. Since Aristotle attributed its discovery to Zeno and its completion to Socrates as well as the extensive use of dialectic by Plato, he apparently poured his concentrated efforts into an investigation into its alternative form of logic, that is deduction or syllogism in his naming. This analutikI–analytiké–was the expression for “method” employed by Aristotle, as it has the same etymological origin that “analysis” has.

On the other hand, as the concept of the so-called “logic” did not appear in the History of Western civilization until the time of Cicero, even what corresponded to the discipline later called “logic” did not appear as the methodology, belonging to the domain of the pure, theoretical science. For, to Aristotle, the philosophical inquiry into the method of philosophy was not a “substantive science,” i.e., that is, logic does not deal with the knowledge about substance or reality and its aspects.

As briefly mentioned above, Aristotle called his philosophical inquiry into the nature and validity of an argument (a logical inference) (i.e., the study of method) “analytic.” This became to signify the philosophical inquiry into the method in the narrowest sense today.

Among the logical inferences, Aristotle distinguished the deduction or syllogism and the dialectic (inductive reasoning).” Now, we shall look into the dialectic as long as it is relevant to our inquiry of syllogism as deduction.

§ 3-2-2. Socratic-Platonic Dialectic

Before getting into the discussions of syllogism, It may be necessary that we will look at the dialectic supposedly created by Zeno of Elea and extensively used by Socrates in his inquiry and mission and perfected by Plato as the alternative method. Aristotle was clearly aware that the dialectic is the dominant method in philosophy during his contemporary. In fact, it is interesting to know that around the time of Cicero, the logic designated not what we consider deduction, but dialectic first. It took a century or two until the logic discovered Aristotelian syllogism.

What is then “dialectic?”
Dialectic has the same etymological origin with the dialogue. Dialogos ‹ “¢o dialogos” or “to dialegein”‹ (dialogue) was speech or talks between the two minds against each other and “‘h dialectikh episthmh”‹dialectiké epistémé‹ (knowledge through dialectic) is the method by discussing and attempting to search knowledge through dialogue by two opposing minds, starting a certain tentative understanding or definition of an idea and gradually exploring and approaching the clearer or clearest knowledge of it. It rooted in the two concepts, consisting “dia”‹”dia”‹ (across or against) and “logos”‹”logos”‹ (speech).

According to Aristotle, Zeno was the founder of dialectic. Zeno’s argument is called “reductio ad absurdum” or “indirect proof” in today’s terminology. Zeno argues that the opposite to the opponent’s hypotheses is indeed true, by reducing from them to absurdity by deducing from the contradictory consequences. The objects of criticism by Zeno were needless to say the existence of “many (things)”‹”ta polla”‹ (ta polla) and that of “motion” (generation and corruption through rarefication and condensation among the four traditional elements, fire, air, water and earth)‹”‘h kinhsis”‹ “hé kinésis,” and Zeno attempted to demonstrate that the so-called two most fundamental self evident true principles (Being exists, while Non-Being does not) are indeed to be abandoned, should these two concepts (plurality and motion) were adopted as “real.” His arguments have been renowned as Zeno’s paradoxes. Probably Aristotle meant that Zeno’s argument needed two souls and one side would show the other side’s hypotheses being wrong. Aristotle might mean that Zeno was not sophistic (merely interested in winning argument and persuading the opponent), but searched truth through logical arguments.

Socrates on the contrary, did not develop the argument based on “reductio ad absurdum.” However, as far as we see in the early Plato’s dialogues (which are rather truthful portrayals of Socrates, as then, the readers of Plato’s early dialogues knew the real Socrates), Socrates appears an extremely clever, eloquent speaker with the quick mind.

Socrates was the first philosopher who developed explicitly a method of philosophical inquiry to pursue truth. This method was no other than dialectic. Socrates’ pursuit or mission always had in front of him the other person whom he discoursed with. Socrates always asked his “opponent” the tentative, mundane “definition” of what he would like to discuss with him.

Let’s say, what is courage. The first tentative definition would be: Courage is Heracles. Socrates would say, Heracles is courageous, namely Heracles was a concrete person who possesses courage. Socrates was asking was what courage is and not what is courage. The opponent would suggest that courage would be fighting violently without fear. Socrates points out the short coming of this elucidation, by saying that the meaning of courage would be to broad, including the barbarous, cruel act, too. Then, the definition will be more refined such that courage is now clarified as the virtue of valor…. Ultimately, such a process of dialectic should elicit and arrive at the truth. As this example reveals, the method of dialectic requires (in the ideal case) two mutually independent mind pursuing the truth starting with an tentative definition of the nature of thing (such as courage, justice, beauty and good) and by critically appraising the proposed “definition” from the other’s insight into the defects of such a “definition” by stipulating and eliciting the ultimate nature of thing. It is the method, it is, according to our definition of method, the process of inquiry into reality itself with the controlled means (through the careful dialogue).

It is interesting to note that in Plato’s early dialogues, Socrates usually never comes to the ultimate reality of a thing, the finial answer of his discourse, but some event interrupted their pursuit and the reader is left unanswered. This has something to do with the nature of the question itself too. Socrates was well aware of the ultimate goal of the dialectic and its value, although he may not be able to clearly elicit by logos (words) what it is. This will become clearer when we discuss Plato’s dialectic.

Plato of course followed Socrates’ footsteps, but he was a little more creative and ambitious and had the ability to “see” what reality is in the sense that he was able to go beyond the dialectic ultimately to have an insight into the “genuine reality.” Dialectic is an attempt to grasp what really is by means of logos, the words and language. In this sense, Aristotle was right in contending that dialectic is the method to grasp by word the definition of what really is. However, the ultimate reality escapes the words, as Lao Tzu clearly stated at the beginning of his Tao Te Ching. Plato went beyond the limit of the position of logos to the viewpoint where one can have an evident insight into what reality is. There is a leap between the end of dialectic and the evident intuitive insight. This leap cannot be jumped by dialectic or the position of logos alone.

Let us briefly look at Plato’s dialectic and his intuitive insight a little more carefully.
§ 3-2-3. Discovery of “nohsis” as “Intuitive cognition” in Plato

Historically speaking, to be sure, when we search the origin of such immediate knowing, it seems obvious that Parmenides was the first who used the concept of “to noein”‹”to noein”‹(to see or to know) or “‘h nohsis”‹hé noésis‹(seeing), i.e., to see or know by “‘h nous”‹hé nous‹(“nous” we normally translate into “reason”). This clearly is found in Parmenides. Take for example:

«N LRà R «N INDNI D0«NI «D RN DNIRN‹Frag. 3 Proclus in Tim. I, 345,
UàI to ADLDNI te INDNI «’ DNI DLLDIRN‹Simplicius Phys. 117, 4
This “noein” or seeing (immediate, intellectual intuition) is not a logical inference, but an intuitive grasp by reason. This cognition is without any mediation.

Anaxagoras also recognized the nous as the principle of motion (=separation into an order in his sense) in the universe, however, this “nous” had the cognitive capability (therefore, by separation “nous” is capable of establishing an order of the universe (=cosmos) unlike Empedocles’ koinés (hate) and protés (love), which are “blind.”

Thus, it may be natural that Plato inherited the intuitive cognitive faculty of nous for the predecessor. Instead of discussing this ¾noein” or “noésis” in details, here we only point out that Plato realized the limits of the linguistic approach and in order to overcome these limits, Plato chose “to noein” above and beyond the dialectic, the linguistic approach to reality.

§ 3-2-4. Aristotle’s Understanding of Dialectic

Now How Aristotle comprehended the dialectic as the method in philosophy? The best place to find this out is to look at his Topics.

In his Topics, Aristotle discloses that the task of this opus (Topics) is “to find a method by which we shall be able to argue about any proposed problem from probable premisses, and shall ourselves under examination avoid self-contradiction,” That is, we shall be able to sustain with success either of the parts implied in all dialectical discussion‹the part of “questioner” (the man as the other speaker who puts questions to his opponent and argues from whatever answers he receives) or that of respondent.”

To rephrase this, our object is, according to Aristotle, to study the “dialectical syllogism.”

1) Dialectic syllogism is distinguished from the scientific syllogism by the fact that its premisses are not true and immediate but are merely probable, that is, such as commend themselves to all men, to most men, or to wise men.

2)Dialectic syllogism is from their merely contentious logism by he fact that it reasons correctly from premisses which are really probable, while the other reasons from premisses that merely seem probable, or else reasons incorrectly.

3) Dialectic has no supreme value which belongs to science, but it is not a value-less pursuit like arguing merely for argument’s sake.

4) The study of dialectic has three main uses:
a) with view to mental gymnastics,
b) with a view to being able to argue with people we meet: if we have previously made ourselves familiar with the opinions of the many and with what follows from them, we shall be able to argue with people from their own premisses:
c) The third use is with a view to the sciences and this use is twofold:
c-i) If we are able to argue questions both pro and con we shall better recognize truth and falsehood when we meet them (against the sophists and their position),
c-ii) the first principles of the sciences, since they cannot themselves be scientifically proved, can be best approached from a study of common opinions such as dialectic provides.

The best examples of establishing the first principles by dialectic may be found in Aristotle’s argument in Metaphysics T for the laws of contradiction and excluded middle.

According to Aristotle’s Topics, there are three main terms used in the “art of dialectic” ‹’h dialektikh tecnh‹ : 1) premiss, 2) problem, 3) thesis.

1) Premiss
According to Aristotle, dialectical premiss is a “question” (the answer to that question strictly speaking), “which commends itself as probable either to all men, to most men, or to wise men.”

2) Problem
Of course, not every question which may properly be put to one’s opponent in discussion may properly be set up as a problem for discussion.
A problem is to be a question possessing either practical or theoretical interest, and on which either there is no current opinion, or there is a difference of opinion between the many and the wise, or among the many, or among the wise.
3) Thesis
Not every problem is a thesis. A thesis is a paradoxical opinion of some celebrated philosopher,” or a view which, though perhaps no one holds it, can be supported by argument. Not all problems nor all theses are of course worth discussing.

The most important aspect of the dialectic Aristotle discussed in Topics in the pursuit of knowledge is, as stated above, to discover and identify “the first principles of the sciences, since they cannot themselves be scientifically proved, can be best approached from a study of common opinions such as dialectic provides.”

Apparently, in Aristotle, the logical inference as syllogism was so much emphasized that the so called Platonic “noésis” was either forgotten or ignored in the science, i.e, the pursuit of knowledge.

As pointed earlier, Aristotle was trying to be creative and thus competitive with Plato. On the other hand, as long as dialectic was employed extensively by Plato, Aristotle took it as a philosophical method for granted and secondly Aristotle looked at it as being less significant than it perhaps actually was. In one place, Aristotle stated that dialectic is an inductive method. On the other place, he mentioned that dialectic is the method to obtain the definition of the nature of a thing. As the method of definition, Socrates was considered the founder of dialectic. We do not discuss this not so in details in this section. We simply point out how Aristotle conceived this method of philosophy in order that we shall be able to deal with his inquiry into the syllogism.

§ 3-2-5. Aristotle’s Discovery of Scientific Syllogism as An Deductive Argument

Linguistically, the concept of syllogism already appears in Plato. Glorious as it may sound, the syllogism was Aristotle’s discovery and invention in its originality by himself. In this sense, as well as in the sense of how long the syllogism was the representative for deduction, we cannot underestimate Aristotle’s ingenuity and greatness of his philosophical investigation. It is indeed an epoch-making to discover that the form, and not the content of a set of propositions, determines the validity or the invalidity of its argument……

Aristotle’s investigation into the deductive reasoning and its process as a process of thought (at a psychological one) attained the fruit in his discovering the syllogism as a deductive argument consisting one conclusion and two premisses. As mentioned before, sun-logismos‹sun logismos‹ signifies a set of “propositions put and gathered together.”

The question which lead Aristotle to investigate the deductive inference and its process lies perhaps in his interest and endeavor in exploring the conditions of scientific knowledge. This is declared in the beginning of Aristotle’s Analytica Prior and he had begun with the forms of proposition and their relationships for the conditions for possible scientific knowledge. In this sense, Aristotle clearly understood “analytics” as the inquiry into the method of philosophy.

According Aristotle, The necessary condition for any scientific knowledge (the pursuit of knowledge) must be at least be of the validity of each step it takes, and this is what observance of the rules of syllogism secures.

Aristotle defines syllogism

It is “an argument in which, certain things having been assumed, something other than these follows of necessity from their truth, without needing any term from outside.”
Naturally hereby Aristotle assumed (with insufficient proof according to W. D. Ross) that this can happen only when a subject-predicate elation between two terms is inferred from subject-predicate relations between them and a third term. Is such an assumption indefensible? No, I do not think so. Aristotle never claims that he would cover all the possible forms of inference. He attempted simply to clarify the rules and structures of an argument by means of the most simple, fundamental type of the inference, which turns out to be the syllogism.

This general abstract definition of syllogism is not so quite intelligible for us, unless we elaborate it more in details. Let us try: In order to understand the nature of syllogism, it is necessary to look at the so-called categorical syllogism: A categorical syllogism consists of three categorical propositions.

A categorical syllogism consists of the three categorical propositions. Now, there are four kinds of categorical propositions:

Universal-Affirmative A: All S is P
Universal Negative E: No S is P
Particular Affirmative I: Some S is P
Particular-Negative: O: Some S is not P

All the non-categorical propositions, according to Aristotle, are reducible to and modified into either one of these four categorical propositions. This contention supports the universality of the form of categorical syllogisms.

According to the above definition of syllogism which consists of three categorical propositions, there can and only can occur three terms among these. In other each of these three terms occurs twice, each in one of the propositions.

Among these three propositions, that proposition whose truth is less obvious (to both the speaker and listener) in comparison to the other two categorical propositions is stipulated as the claim or the conclusion. The conclusion must be supported by the other two premisses, the other two categorical propositions. There are such linguistic devices to indicate that being the conclusion as “therefore,” “thus,” “Consequently,” etc. Once we identified the conclusion, the predicate term of the conclusion is called “Major Term.” and One of the Premisses which contains the Major Term (the predicate term of the conclusion) is called the “Major Premiss.” The Subject Term of the conclusion is called the “Minor Term.” The premiss which contains the Minor Term (=the subject term of the conclusion) is called the Minor Premiss. In order to linguistically indicate the premisses after those conjunctions as are “because,” “For,” “as,” “since,” etc., they are called Premiss Indicators. The two terms which only occur in the premisses and not in the conclusion are called “Middle Terms.” The Major term is connected to the Minor term in the conclusion by virtue of these Middle Terms. These three terms fulfills the conditions in the above definition of syllogism. The Middle Terms function as mediators to enable the conclusion drawn from the two premisses. When the truth of conclusion is justified (without any other term) on the basis of the truths of the two premisses alone, as these two premisses are to be more or very obviously acceptable as true (both to the speaker and the listener). In this case, it is said that the truths of the two premisses implies the truth of the conclusion, and that the argument (syllogism) is valid.

Aristotle’s great discovery lies, however, in the astonishing finding that the meanings or the contents of the three categorical propositions do not play an important role whether that syllogism is valid or invalid. The validity or the invalidity of an argument is solely determined by the forms of syllogism.

The truth of each of the categorical propositions is relevant to the validity of the syllogism so long as it is excluded that the two true premisses imply the false conclusion and the meanings of the propositions are totally irrelevant.

Thus, a categorical syllogism is valid or invalid depending upon a certain forms. They are determined by the combination of the Mood, the order of the propositions, (the Major Premiss-The Minor Premiss-The Conclusion) such as A-A-A and the Figure, the positions of the Middle Terms in the Major and the Minor Premisses.

§ 3-3-1. Logic: Deduction as “methods”

In philosophical inquiry, the study of logical arguments are considered the inquiry into “methods” in the perhaps widest possible sense, although it persisted for a long time in the Western culture. For logic was viewed as the philosophical inquiry, which makes sure that each step of the scientific (=philosophical knowledge) investigation is not fallacious, that is, not invalid, so that the entire enterprise of philosophical inquiry is considered a valid one.

Thus, there are the method of deduction and the method of induction. In either case of the logical arguments, the method is viewed as the way to transfer the truth of the premisses to that of the conclusion, if indeed valid, and the justification of the conclusion by the premisses. In other words, logical inference is to obtain, through appropriate logical principles, the true knowledge as the conclusion stating the previously unknown on the basis of the premisses the propositions of which are already known or are more easily acceptable as true7. This seems to be the most common, mundane use of a logical argument.

Not only in our mundane, everyday life and natural sciences, but also in philosophical investigation, we employ both deduction and induction (the latter of which is often called the empirical generalization). Deduction and induction are logical reasonings or inferences (which are called “arguments” in the logical terminology), which, proceeding from the premisses (a set of statements), attempts to arrive at the conclusion (which is often also called “claim,” that which one would like to establish as one’s own contention). Both reasoning and inference are confused as psychological processes, which has nothing to do with logic, so the logician calls it “argument.”

An argument (argumentum) consists of a set of statements (called premisses) and the conclusion. The conclusion is a claim or contention which the speaker or the writer firmly holds and yet often the conclusion in itself do not appear clear to the hearer or the reader. Thus, we attempts to support the claim or the conclusion by means of a set of premisses, which can be more easily acceptable as true by the hearer or the reader.

In deduction, whether it is mathematical logic or syllogism, an argument is said to be valid, if and only if the premisses imply the conclusion, or if and only if the premisses is true, the conclusion cannot be false. An invalid argument is called a “fallacy.”

Among fallacies, there are formal fallacies and informal fallacies. The formal fallacy invalid argument, if and only if it violates the logical rule, while the informal fallacy occurs, when the premisses only appear to imply the conclusion by virtue of some semantical reason and yet in truth the premisses do not imply the conclusion.

A proof or a demonstration is a logical procedure to show that an argument is valid or invalid. The formal character of validity or invalidity of an deductive argument was an enormous discovery of Aristotle, whether it is in mathematical logic or the traditional syllogism.

When the argument is valid in deduction, As a method, deduction is as if it were reverse to induction in such a way that induction is an empirical generalization of a certain relationship from a great number of instances each of which individually asserts that relationship to conclude that such a relationship exists universally: Deduction draws the truth of the conclusion necessarily by means of the combination of a set of truths of the premisses. While induction is quite useful in obtaining a certain knowledge on the basis of noting that knowledge found in each and every instance as a premiss. Therefore, the truth of the conclusion is not implied logically from the truths of the premisses, but the conclusion may be said at best “sound.” In other words, the empirical generalization, induction, may be falsified by one instance which does not agree with the rest of the instances. On the contrary, the truth of deduction or the logical truth of the conclusion is arrived at necessarily by means of the logical rule and the set of the truths of the premisses. Therefore, the logical truth of a deductive argument can no way be falsified by a concrete instance which does not agree with the logical inference from the premisses to the conclusion.
§ 3-3-2. Deduction‹ Syllogism, Propositional Calculus‹

When the truth(s) of the premiss(es) logically implies the truth of the conclusion, we call this deductive argument “valid.” Only when the truth(s) of the premiss(es) logically implies the falsehood of the conclusion, then it is called “invalid.” In other words, when one of the premisses is indeed false, then you may draw any conclusion, whether the conclusion is false or true.

At the end of the 19th Century, Boole, the great mathematician, devised to develop an axiomatic system with three (four sometimes) truth-functional connectives: “and,” “not,” and “either …or” (or/and “if ….then). Thus the propositional calculus of the first order was introduced and as the result, it becomes obvious that the so-called logic may be indistinguishable from or identical with the propositional calculus.

The meanings of those truth functional connectives depend upon the natural language and the latter is used as the meta-language in order to develop and formulate the object language of the propositional calculus. This mathematic logic was extensively used at the beginning of this century in order to provide and formulate the foundation of mathematics (principia mathematica for exmaple by Whitehead and Russell) and physics by the so-called logical positivists.

Although the philosophy of science became the dominant philosophical trend in the first half of the twentieth century, first their attempt to completely formalized the object language failed (See Rudolf Carnap, Logical Syntax of Language and Meaning and Necessity).

Through the development of the criterion for the empirical signfiicance, the criterion was weakened everytime when it met the difficulty. And finally, the distinction between the proposition of a natural science and that of a speculative metaphysics regarding the empirical meaning of the proposition had to be abandoned in 1960 (See, Carl Hempel’s famous article on the criterion of the empirical sginficance in Revue de Philosophie Internationale).

Nevertheless, many questions regarding the foundation of the natural sciences and those of their formalization provided valuable answers. In case of the propositional calculus of the first order is more extensive than the Aristotelian syllogism and the former includes the disjunctive and the hypothetical propositions in their deductive system. At the middle of this century, the modal logic (both in Germany and the US), or the many-value logic has been proposed and many attempts have been done, but the reliable success has not been yet evidenced.